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Prefix Guidance: A Steering Wheel for Large Language Models to Defend Against Jailbreak Attacks
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In recent years, the rapid development of large language models (LLMs) has achieved remarkable performance across various tasks. However, research indicates that LLMs are vulnerable to jailbreak attacks, where adversaries can induce the generation of harmful content through meticulously crafted prompts. This vulnerability poses significant challenges to the secure use and promotion of LLMs. Existing defense methods offer protection from different perspectives but often suffer from insufficient effectiveness or a significant impact on the model's capabilities. In this paper, we propose a plug-and-play and easy-to-deploy jailbreak defense framework, namely Prefix Guidance (PG), which guides the model to identify harmful prompts by directly setting the first few tokens of the model's output. This approach combines the model's inherent security capabilities with an external classifier to defend against jailbreak attacks. We demonstrate the effectiveness of PG across three models and five attack methods. Compared to baselines, our approach is generally more effective on average. Additionally, results on the Just-Eval benchmark further confirm PG's superiority to preserve the model's performance. our code is available at https://github.com/weiyezhimeng/Prefix-Guidance.
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Cited by 2 Pith papers
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SoK: Systematizing LLM Prompt Security: Taxonomies, Datasets, and Unified Evaluation of Attacks and Defenses
A systemization of LLM jailbreak security that adds linked taxonomies, an evaluation platform, and JailbreakDB, while its main attack–defense comparison results remain deferred.
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On Almost Surely Safe Alignment of Large Language Models at Inference-Time
An inference-time beam-search method with a safety-state tracker and latent critic enforces a user-supplied safety cost model, with an almost-sure guarantee only relative to that model.
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