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POEX: Towards Policy Executable Jailbreak Attacks Against the LLM-based Robots

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arxiv 2412.16633 v3 pith:V6B3FAPR submitted 2024-12-21 cs.RO cs.AIcs.CY

classification cs.ROcs.AIcs.CY
keywords jailbreakattacksllm-basedrobotsrobotexecutablellmspoex
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
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The integration of LLMs into robots has witnessed significant growth, where LLMs can convert instructions into executable robot policies. However, the inherent vulnerability of LLMs to jailbreak attacks brings critical security risks from the digital domain to the physical world. An attacked LLM-based robot could execute harmful policies and cause physical harm. In this paper, we investigate the feasibility and rationale of jailbreak attacks against LLM-based robots and answer three research questions: (1) How applicable are existing LLM jailbreak attacks against LLM-based robots? (2) What unique challenges arise if they are not directly applicable? (3) How to defend against such jailbreak attacks? To this end, we first construct a "human-object-environment" robot risks-oriented Harmful-RLbench and then conduct a measurement study on LLM-based robot systems. Our findings conclude that traditional LLM jailbreak attacks are inapplicable in robot scenarios, and we identify two unique challenges: determining policy-executable optimization directions and accurately evaluating robot-jailbroken policies. To enable a more thorough security analysis, we introduce POEX (POlicy EXecutable) jailbreak, a red-teaming framework that induces harmful yet executable policy to jailbreak LLM-based robots. POEX incorporates hidden layer gradient optimization to guarantee jailbreak success and policy execution as well as a multi-agent evaluator to accurately assess the practical executability of policies. Experiments conducted on the real-world robotic systems and in simulation demonstrate the efficacy of POEX, highlighting critical security vulnerabilities and its transferability across LLMs. Finally, we propose prompt-based and model-based defenses to mitigate attacks. Our findings underscore the urgent need for security measures to ensure the safe deployment of LLM-based robots in critical applications.

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Forward citations

Cited by 7 Pith papers

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. Self-Evolving Just-In-Time Memory for Proactive Embodied Safety

    cs.LG 2026-06 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    A Just-In-Time Memory framework with graph-based state tracking and self-evolving safety skills improves safe task completion in household robots by up to 30 percentage points on IS-Bench.

  2. Safety in Embodied AI: A Survey of Risks, Attacks, and Defenses

    cs.CR 2026-03 unverdicted novelty 6.0 of 10

    The survey organizes over 400 papers on embodied AI safety into a multi-level taxonomy and flags overlooked issues such as fragile multimodal fusion and unstable planning under jailbreaks.

  3. State Backdoor: Towards Stealthy Real-world Poisoning Attack on Vision-Language-Action Model in State Space

    cs.CR 2026-01 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    A backdoor attack on vision-language-action robot policies uses the arm's initial joint configuration as the trigger, achieving >90% triggered failure with only small clean-task degradation.

  4. ANNIE: Be Careful of Your Robots

    cs.AI 2025-09 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    The authors build a safety-centered benchmark and attack method that induces vision-language-action robot policies to violate ISO-based safety rules in a majority of tested episodes.

  5. Disrupting Vision-Language Model-Driven Navigation Services via Adversarial Object Fusion

    cs.CR 2025-05 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    AdvOF crafts 3D adversarial objects that mislead VLM perception across multiple views and degrade VLN agent navigation success in simulation.

  6. Security of World-Model-Based Embodied AI: A Lifecycle of Threats, Defenses, and Evaluation

    cs.CR 2026-07 conditional novelty 5.5 of 10

    World-model-based embodied AI creates a predictive security boundary where attacks on data, sensors, imagination, ranking, and feedback can turn into unsafe physical action and false safety certificates.

  7. On the Dual-Use Dilemma in Physical Reasoning and Force

    cs.RO 2025-05 conditional novelty 5.0 of 10

    Adding Asimov-style safety prompts to vision-language models lowers both harmful and helpful force generation for contact-rich robotic tasks.

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