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arxiv: 2604.13242 · v2 · submitted 2026-04-14 · 💻 cs.CY · cs.AI

Recognition: unknown

On the Creativity of AI Agents

Giorgio Franceschelli, Mirco Musolesi

Authors on Pith no claims yet

Pith reviewed 2026-05-10 13:37 UTC · model grok-4.3

classification 💻 cs.CY cs.AI
keywords AI agentscreativitylarge language modelsfunctionalist perspectiveontological perspectiveartificial intelligence
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The pith

LLM agents produce creative outputs but lack the personal and social processes that mark human creativity.

A machine-rendered reading of the paper's core claim, the machinery that carries it, and where it could break.

The paper divides creativity into two views for analyzing LLM-based agents. One view judges creativity by the traits of the finished output. The other view requires looking at the internal processes plus the social and personal involvement that produced it. The authors conclude that current agents reach the first standard at moderate levels but miss essential parts of the second. This distinction shapes arguments about whether such agents should be developed further or used in creative roles.

Core claim

LLM agents exhibit functionalist creativity, defined through observable characteristics of their outputs, though not at the highest levels of sophistication, yet they lack key aspects of ontological creativity that involve underlying processes along with social and personal dimensions. The paper evaluates whether it is desirable for agentic systems to achieve both forms, weighing potential benefits against risks and outlining possible development paths toward forms of artificial creativity that support human society.

What carries the argument

The functionalist-ontological split, where functionalist creativity is judged solely by output characteristics while ontological creativity requires examination of processes and social-personal dimensions.

If this is right

  • Current LLM agents can already be deployed for moderate-level creative tasks based on output quality alone.
  • Attaining ontological creativity in agents would require new design approaches beyond scaling language models.
  • Risks of agents gaining both forms of creativity include potential misalignment with human values or over-reliance by users.
  • Pathways exist to steer development so that artificial creativity augments rather than replaces human creative activity.

Where Pith is reading between the lines

These are editorial extensions of the paper, not claims the author makes directly.

  • The split implies that tests for AI creativity should include long-term interaction studies rather than single-output evaluations.
  • It raises the question of whether adding memory or embodiment modules could address the missing ontological elements.
  • The paper's evaluation of benefits and risks could extend to regulatory questions about labeling AI-generated creative work.

Load-bearing premise

That creativity in AI can be exhaustively separated into observable output traits on one side and deeper personal-social processes on the other, with current agents clearly failing the second side.

What would settle it

An empirical case of an LLM agent demonstrating creative work that includes independent personal reflection or social negotiation not reducible to pattern matching from training data.

read the original abstract

Large language models (LLMs), particularly when integrated into agentic systems, have demonstrated human- and even superhuman-level performance across multiple domains. Whether these systems can truly be considered creative, however, remains a matter of debate, as conclusions heavily depend on the definitions, evaluation methods, and specific use cases employed. In this paper, we analyse creativity along two complementary macro-level perspectives. The first is a functionalist perspective, focusing on the observable characteristics of creative outputs. The second is an ontological perspective, emphasising the underlying processes, as well as the social and personal dimensions involved in creativity. We focus on LLM agents and we argue that they exhibit functionalist creativity, albeit not at its most sophisticated levels, while they continue to lack key aspects of ontological creativity. Finally, we discuss whether it is desirable for agentic systems to attain both forms of creativity, evaluating potential benefits and risks, and proposing pathways toward artificial creativity that can enhance human society.

Editorial analysis

A structured set of objections, weighed in public.

Desk editor's note, referee report, simulated authors' rebuttal, and a circularity audit. Tearing a paper down is the easy half of reading it; the pith above is the substance, this is the friction.

Referee Report

1 major / 2 minor

Summary. The manuscript analyzes creativity in LLM agents using two complementary perspectives: functionalist, which focuses on observable characteristics of creative outputs, and ontological, which emphasizes underlying processes along with social and personal dimensions. The authors argue that LLM agents exhibit functionalist creativity, though not at the highest levels, but lack key aspects of ontological creativity. They conclude by discussing the desirability of agents attaining both forms and proposing pathways for artificial creativity that benefits human society.

Significance. This work contributes to the ongoing debate on AI creativity by providing a dual-perspective framework. If the ontological limitations are rigorously demonstrated, it could influence how we design and evaluate agentic systems, potentially steering development towards more socially embedded creative processes. The balanced discussion of benefits and risks is a strength, offering practical considerations for the field.

major comments (1)
  1. [Ontological perspective] The ontological perspective section defines ontological creativity via high-level references to underlying processes, social embedding, and personal dimensions but supplies no explicit necessary conditions, thresholds, counter-examples, or evaluation criteria. This renders the central claim that LLM agents 'continue to lack key aspects' an interpretive stance rather than a verifiable result, as alternative framings (e.g., extended functionalist accounts incorporating simulated social roles) are not ruled out.
minor comments (2)
  1. [Abstract] The abstract is lengthy and could be condensed while preserving the core arguments and conclusions.
  2. [Introduction] Some citations to prior literature on creativity definitions could be expanded with more recent or field-specific references for completeness.

Simulated Author's Rebuttal

1 responses · 0 unresolved

We thank the referee for their constructive and insightful feedback, which helps clarify how to strengthen the rigor of our analysis. We respond to the single major comment below and will revise the manuscript accordingly.

read point-by-point responses
  1. Referee: [Ontological perspective] The ontological perspective section defines ontological creativity via high-level references to underlying processes, social embedding, and personal dimensions but supplies no explicit necessary conditions, thresholds, counter-examples, or evaluation criteria. This renders the central claim that LLM agents 'continue to lack key aspects' an interpretive stance rather than a verifiable result, as alternative framings (e.g., extended functionalist accounts incorporating simulated social roles) are not ruled out.

    Authors: We appreciate the referee highlighting the need for greater explicitness in the ontological section. Our framing draws from established literature (Boden on process creativity, Csikszentmihalyi on social systems, and accounts of personal embodiment), but we agree it was presented at a high level without enumerated necessary conditions or direct counter-examples. In the revised manuscript we will add a dedicated subsection that states three necessary conditions for ontological creativity: (1) intrinsic motivation arising from an agent's own persistent goals rather than prompt-driven optimization, (2) genuine social embedding through reciprocal, accountable interactions within a cultural community that can confer or withhold status, and (3) personal dimensions including embodied experience and autobiographical continuity. We will supply counter-examples contrasting LLM agents with human creators who satisfy these conditions. We will also explicitly address alternative framings by arguing that simulated social roles remain functionalist because they lack ontological grounding: they produce outputs that can be evaluated externally but do not participate in the actual social ontology that validates creativity. These additions will convert the central claim into a more verifiable, criterion-based argument while preserving the paper's core distinction. revision: yes

Circularity Check

0 steps flagged

No significant circularity in the paper's analytical framework

full rationale

The paper introduces functionalist and ontological perspectives on creativity as complementary macro-level views drawn from prior literature, then applies them to LLM agents by contrasting observable output characteristics against the absence of underlying processes, social embedding, and personal dimensions. This evaluation rests on independently established properties of LLMs rather than redefining the perspectives to force the conclusion, fitting parameters to data, or invoking self-citations as load-bearing justification for the distinction itself. No equations, predictions, or self-referential chains reduce the central claim to its inputs by construction; the derivation is self-contained as an interpretive analysis open to external scrutiny.

Axiom & Free-Parameter Ledger

0 free parameters · 1 axioms · 0 invented entities

The central claim rests on the assumption that creativity admits a clean functionalist/ontological partition and that this partition is sufficient to evaluate current AI agents. No free parameters or invented entities are introduced.

axioms (1)
  • domain assumption Creativity can be usefully analyzed via two complementary macro-level perspectives: functionalist (observable output characteristics) and ontological (underlying processes plus social and personal dimensions).
    This partition is invoked at the start of the analysis and structures the entire argument about LLM agents.

pith-pipeline@v0.9.0 · 5455 in / 1216 out tokens · 65661 ms · 2026-05-10T13:37:09.785398+00:00 · methodology

discussion (0)

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