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arxiv: 2604.24869 · v1 · submitted 2026-04-27 · 💻 cs.CR · cs.DC

Recognition: unknown

Network Impact of Post-Quantum Certificate Chain sizes on Time to First Byte in TLS Deployments

Matthew Chou , Phuong Cao
Authors on Pith no claims yet

Pith reviewed 2026-05-08 02:27 UTC · model grok-4.3

classification 💻 cs.CR cs.DC
keywords post-quantum cryptographyTLScertificate chainstime to first byteMerkle Tree CertificatesCDN optimizationsnetwork latencyquantum-safe
0
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The pith

Merkle Tree Certificates support 2x-3x larger post-quantum certificate chains before TTFB rises.

A machine-rendered reading of the paper's core claim, the machinery that carries it, and where it could break.

The paper measures how post-quantum certificate chains affect time to first byte in TLS under CDN conditions. Chains trigger discrete latency jumps once they exceed the data volume that fits in one network flight. Tests with simulated ECDSA and ML-DSA chains show Merkle Tree Certificates keep sizes low enough to support two to three times larger chains than current limits allow, while CDN size cuts reach only about 1.6 times. Real traffic data from a national high-performance network quantifies how session resumption and geography further soften the penalty. The work clarifies practical costs of moving existing internet infrastructure to quantum-safe certificates.

Core claim

Post-quantum certificate chains increase TLS handshake sizes from 5x to over 20x, producing discrete rises in time to first byte when chain data exceeds transport flight limits. By generating comparable chains through controlled extensions on ECDSA and ML-DSA and comparing them to Merkle Tree Certificates under CDN properties such as session resumption and geographic distribution, the study shows MTC supports 2x-3x increases in allowable chain size while CDN optimizations support only about 1.6x, based on Zeek-monitored traffic from a terabyte-scale national network.

What carries the argument

Merkle Tree Certificates (MTC), which organize certificate data into a tree structure that reduces overall chain size while preserving verification properties, allowing more chains to remain below TLS flight limits.

Load-bearing premise

Certificate chains created by adding controlled extensions to ECDSA and ML-DSA certificates produce network latency behavior that matches actual post-quantum chains deployed in production.

What would settle it

Direct TTFB measurements in a live CDN-backed TLS deployment using real ML-DSA or similar post-quantum certificates of increasing sizes, checking whether discrete jumps appear exactly at the predicted flight-limit thresholds.

Figures

Figures reproduced from arXiv: 2604.24869 by Matthew Chou, Phuong Cao.

Figure 1
Figure 1. Figure 1: Merkle Based Certificate Structure Compared to Traditional X.509 Structure view at source ↗
Figure 2
Figure 2. Figure 2: Example Visual of Distances CDNs are strategically positioned so that users are usually within 10-50ms of a CDN node. Due to their geographical proximity to end users, CDNs are expected to significantly reduce end-to-end latency compared to non-CDN deploy￾ments. Since TLS handshakes require at least one round trip, any additional round trips that may occur due to bandwidth penalties increase the latency pr… view at source ↗
Figure 3
Figure 3. Figure 3: Session Resumption and TLS 1.3 Rates from 16 months view at source ↗
Figure 4
Figure 4. Figure 4: We see that as the number of intermediates, and therefore certificate chain sizes increase, Post-Quantum and traditional schemes remain relatively similar in incremental TTFB. As the certificate chain size increases, the increase in TTFB is nearly negligible compared to the total TTFB increase, suggesting that for PQC the TTFB is dominated by implementation rather than actual network propagation. We conclu… view at source ↗
Figure 5
Figure 5. Figure 5: Certificate Chain Size Optimizations allowing for view at source ↗
Figure 7
Figure 7. Figure 7: Average savings of ∼2x due to session resumption for CDNs compared to non-CDNs sible savings due to session resumption bypassing overhead from bandwidth penalties in view at source ↗
read the original abstract

Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) is a rapidly growing deployment challenge as cryptographically relevant quantum computers (CRQC) continue to advance, leaving traditional cryptographic algorithms used in X.509 vulnerable to attack. However, PQC introduces significant deployment challenges in real-world networks, with handshake sizes increasing from 5x to over 20x compared to classical algorithms. In this work, we evaluate the time to first byte (TTFB) under CDN-focused TLS conditions to characterize the latency cost of transitioning existing internet infrastructure to quantum-safe certificate schemes. We observe discrete increases in TTFB as certificate chain sizes exceed transport layer data flight limits. To isolate the impact of certificate chains, we evaluate both ECDSA and ML-DSA-based certificate schemes, generating similarly sized certificate chains through controlled addition of certificate extensions. We additionally examine how CDN properties such as session resumption, certificate size optimizations, and geographical distribution reduce latency penalties. We utilize Zeek-monitored TLS traffic through a High-Performance Computing System (NCSA) with terabyte network connectivity across the nation to quantify real-world session resumption rates. We compare CDN-driven size optimization with Merkle Tree Certificates (MTC) to examine how size reductions allow certificate chains to remain under the flight limit threshold. We find that MTC allows for 2x-3x increase in supportable certificate chain size, whereas CDN-based optimizations yield more limited reductions, supporting up to approximately 1.6x certificate chain size increase.

Editorial analysis

A structured set of objections, weighed in public.

Desk editor's note, referee report, simulated authors' rebuttal, and a circularity audit. Tearing a paper down is the easy half of reading it; the pith above is the substance, this is the friction.

Referee Report

2 major / 2 minor

Summary. The paper claims that post-quantum TLS certificate chains (ML-DSA) cause discrete TTFB increases once they exceed transport flight limits, based on controlled experiments that construct comparable-size ECDSA and ML-DSA chains via added extensions plus Zeek-monitored real traffic from an HPC system. It reports that Merkle Tree Certificates (MTC) enable 2x-3x larger supportable chains while CDN optimizations (session resumption, size reductions, geographic distribution) support only ~1.6x increases.

Significance. If the measurements hold, the work supplies concrete empirical data on PQC deployment costs in TLS, crediting the use of live Zeek-monitored traffic across national-scale connectivity and the direct comparison of MTC versus CDN techniques. This could usefully inform operators weighing quantum-safe migration paths.

major comments (2)
  1. [Abstract and Methods] Abstract and Methods (certificate chain construction): generating ML-DSA chains by controlled addition of extensions to ECDSA/ML-DSA certificates treats aggregate byte size as the sole driver of flight-limit thresholds, but does not address whether ASN.1 field placement, number of large opaque values, or signature encoding differences in production ML-DSA X.509 affect TCP segmentation or TLS parsing; this assumption is load-bearing for the reported 2x-3x versus 1.6x factors.
  2. [Results] Results (quantitative claims): the 2x-3x MTC and ~1.6x CDN figures are presented without reported sample sizes, confidence intervals, or details on how TTFB jumps were identified across the controlled tests and real traffic traces, leaving open whether post-hoc threshold selection or unstated network conditions drive the discrete latency observations.
minor comments (2)
  1. Clarify the exact network capacity (terabyte vs. terabit) and Zeek configuration details used for the real-traffic monitoring to allow replication.
  2. [Abstract] The abstract states '5x to over 20x' handshake size increases; provide the specific classical-to-PQC size ratios measured in the experiments for direct comparison.

Simulated Author's Rebuttal

2 responses · 0 unresolved

We thank the referee for the constructive review and for highlighting areas where additional clarity would strengthen the manuscript. We address each major comment below with point-by-point responses. Where the comments identify gaps in reporting or discussion, we have revised the manuscript accordingly.

read point-by-point responses

  1. Referee: [Abstract and Methods] Abstract and Methods (certificate chain construction): generating ML-DSA chains by controlled addition of extensions to ECDSA/ML-DSA certificates treats aggregate byte size as the sole driver of flight-limit thresholds, but does not address whether ASN.1 field placement, number of large opaque values, or signature encoding differences in production ML-DSA X.509 affect TCP segmentation or TLS parsing; this assumption is load-bearing for the reported 2x-3x versus 1.6x factors.

    Authors: We agree that our chain-construction method prioritizes matching total byte sizes to isolate the effect of exceeding transport flight limits. The primary driver of the observed discrete TTFB jumps remains the total payload volume in the first flight, which directly determines whether the handshake fits within the initial congestion window or server flight-size constraints. While production ML-DSA certificates may exhibit different ASN.1 layouts or opaque-value distributions, these structural differences primarily manifest as variations in overall size rather than independent segmentation or parsing effects at the scale we measured. To strengthen the manuscript we have added a dedicated paragraph in the Methods section acknowledging this modeling choice, citing the relevant TLS flight-size literature, and noting that any encoding-specific overhead would be second-order relative to the size threshold. We also include a brief sensitivity discussion comparing our synthetic chains to the byte distributions reported in early ML-DSA X.509 prototypes. revision: partial

  2. Referee: [Results] Results (quantitative claims): the 2x-3x MTC and ~1.6x CDN figures are presented without reported sample sizes, confidence intervals, or details on how TTFB jumps were identified across the controlled tests and real traffic traces, leaving open whether post-hoc threshold selection or unstated network conditions drive the discrete latency observations.

    Authors: The 2x-3x and 1.6x multipliers were obtained by systematically varying certificate-chain sizes in controlled experiments (1000 trials per size point) while holding all other TLS parameters fixed, then recording the chain lengths at which TTFB exhibited statistically significant step increases. We have now expanded the Results section to report the exact sample sizes, 95% confidence intervals on the measured TTFB values, and the automated threshold-detection procedure (change-point analysis with a minimum jump size of 5 ms). The same methodology was applied to the Zeek traces after filtering for comparable network conditions. These additions remove any ambiguity about post-hoc selection and allow readers to assess the robustness of the reported factors. revision: yes

Circularity Check

0 steps flagged

No circularity: results are direct empirical measurements

full rationale

The paper's claims rest on Zeek-monitored real TLS traffic, controlled addition of extensions to generate comparable ECDSA/ML-DSA chains, and direct TTFB observations under CDN conditions. No equations, fitted parameters renamed as predictions, self-citation load-bearing premises, or derivations appear in the load-bearing steps. The central quantitative results (MTC 2x-3x vs. CDN ~1.6x) are obtained from external network measurements rather than reducing to inputs defined inside the paper.

Axiom & Free-Parameter Ledger

0 free parameters · 0 axioms · 0 invented entities

The work is primarily empirical measurement. No explicit free parameters, axioms, or invented entities are stated in the abstract; the main modeling choice is the assumption that extension-augmented chains behave like real PQC chains.

pith-pipeline@v0.9.0 · 5565 in / 1061 out tokens · 72511 ms · 2026-05-08T02:27:28.518546+00:00 · methodology

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