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Certified Defences Against Adversarial Patch Attacks on Semantic Segmentation
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Adversarial patch attacks are an emerging security threat for real world deep learning applications. We present Demasked Smoothing, the first approach (up to our knowledge) to certify the robustness of semantic segmentation models against this threat model. Previous work on certifiably defending against patch attacks has mostly focused on image classification task and often required changes in the model architecture and additional training which is undesirable and computationally expensive. In Demasked Smoothing, any segmentation model can be applied without particular training, fine-tuning, or restriction of the architecture. Using different masking strategies, Demasked Smoothing can be applied both for certified detection and certified recovery. In extensive experiments we show that Demasked Smoothing can on average certify 64% of the pixel predictions for a 1% patch in the detection task and 48% against a 0.5% patch for the recovery task on the ADE20K dataset.
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Cited by 1 Pith paper
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PatchDEMUX: A Certifiably Robust Framework for Multi-label Classifiers Against Adversarial Patches
PatchDEMUX extends any certified single-label patch defense to multi-label classifiers by per-class certification and a location-aware procedure that tightens bounds when the attacker can plant only one patch.
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