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When Data-Free Knowledge Distillation Meets Non-Transferable Teacher: Escaping Out-of-Distribution Trap is All You Need

T0 review · 3 major / 6 minor · reviewed 2026-08-06 · deepseek-v4-flash

Pith's one-line read The paper claims non-transferable teachers poison data-free distillation with OOD knowledge, and a PGD robustness split lets students keep ID knowledge while unlearning that trap.

desk verdict A solid empirical paper that identifies a real failure mode in DFKD with NTL teachers and offers a workable defense, but it overstates ID gains and leaves the central grouping mechanism under-validated. read the letter →

arxiv 2507.04119 v1 pith:HI4236PB submitted 2025-07-05 cs.LG cs.AIcs.CRcs.CV

classification cs.LGcs.AIcs.CRcs.CV
keywords data-freeknowledgedistillationnon-transferablelearningout-of-distributiontrapadversarialrobustnessprojectedgradientdescentsyntheticdatafilteringbackdoorattackdefense
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal

The pith

A machine-rendered reading of the paper's core claim, the machinery that carries it, and where it could break.

The reading

The paper identifies a failure mode in data-free knowledge distillation when the teacher is a non-transferable learning (NTL) model: the generator latches onto the teacher's out-of-distribution knowledge instead of its in-distribution knowledge, degrading the student's ID accuracy while transferring misleading OOD behavior. The proposed fix, ATEsc, uses the teacher's own adversarial robustness to split synthetic samples: samples whose predicted label flips under a PGD attack are treated as ID-like and used for distillation, while samples that stay robust are treated as OOD-like and used to make the student forget the teacher's OOD outputs. The claim is that this simple plug-in consistently improves ID knowledge transfer and suppresses OOD-knowledge transfer across close-set, open-set, and backdoor NTL settings, with experiments on DFQ, CMI, and NAYER baselines. If true, it turns a newly identified security risk of untrusted teachers into a manageable one, and a tool meant to block model transfer becomes a source of good knowledge that can be distilled safely.

What carries the argument

The central mechanism is the ID/OOD adversarial robustness gap of NTL teachers, operationalized by a label-change criterion: a synthetic sample is called ID-like (fragile) if an untargeted PGD attack within an $\ell_p$ ball of radius $\epsilon$ changes the teacher's predicted label, and OOD-like (robust) if the label is unchanged. Two losses then carry the argument: a calibrated knowledge distillation loss $L_{\mathrm{ckd}}$ on the fragile group, and a maximized forgetting term $L_{\mathrm{forget}}$ on the robust group, combined as $L_{\mathrm{ATEsc}} = L_{\mathrm{ckd}} - \min(1, \lambda L_{\mathrm{forget}})$. This turns the teacher's own decision-boundary geometry into a domain classifier for synthetic data.

What would settle it

Train an NTL teacher on a domain pair where OOD samples sit close to decision boundaries, or adversarially train the teacher on the ID domain to close the robustness gap, then run ATEsc with a fixed epsilon: if the label-change split no longer yields a fragile group enriched in real ID samples and a robust group enriched in OOD samples, or if ID accuracy stops improving while OOD accuracy stays high, the robustness-gap premise fails.

Watch

Extended reading notes

Core claim

NTL teachers impose an OOD trap on data-free knowledge distillation: because the teacher was trained to push OOD-domain features far from ID features, the generator's adversarial exploration and batch-normalization statistics matching make it synthesize OOD-like samples that activate the teacher's misleading OOD outputs. The student then mimics those outputs, so it inherits OOD behavior and its ID accuracy collapses. The paper's central claim is that this trap can be escaped without any real data by exploiting the same geometry that created it: NTL teachers are adversarially fragile on ID data but robust on OOD data. ATEsc runs an untargeted PGD attack on each synthetic sample and sorts samples by whether the predicted label changes; the label-changing (fragile) group is used for standard KL distillation, and the label-stable (robust) group is used as a negative set whose teacher outputs the student is trained to diverge from. The paper shows this split filters synthetic distributions back toward the ID domain and reduces inherited OOD accuracy and attack success rates across close-set, open-set, and backdoor configurations.

Load-bearing premise

The load-bearing premise is that a fixed-epsilon untargeted PGD attack on synthetic samples reliably flags exactly the samples whose teacher predictions are ID knowledge rather than OOD knowledge, i.e., that the NTL teacher's ID/OOD robustness gap persists on synthetic data throughout training.

Editorial extensions

If this is right

  • Data-free distillation students can safely learn from non-transferable teachers, recovering near-teacher ID accuracy instead of random-guess or OOD-mimicking behavior.
  • The forgetting term suppresses backdoor transfer: in NTL-based backdoor settings, attack success rates drop substantially compared with the original baselines and with the distillation-only variant.
  • The method is plug-and-play: any adversarial-exploration DFKD baseline can add ATEsc by changing only the distillation loss applied after the generator update.
  • Because it relies only on the teacher and generated samples, the defense requires no access to real ID or OOD data, preserving the data-free setting.
  • Non-transferable learning becomes less reliable as a model-extraction defense, since an attacker with only a generator can reclaim ID knowledge; this IP-protection concern is noted in the paper itself.

Reading between the lines

Editorial extensions of the paper, not claims the author makes directly.

  • Inference: the same robustness-gap principle may generalize beyond NTL teachers to any teacher whose decision-boundary geometry encodes domain membership, including conventionally backdoored teachers where trigger-domain samples are unusually robust.
  • Inference: practical use of ATEsc will require per-task selection of the perturbation bound $\epsilon$, since the paper's own sensitivity analysis shows that too small an $\epsilon$ weakens the fragile/robust separation.
  • Inference: an adversarial arms race is implied: an NTL teacher trained to be adversarially robust on ID or fragile on OOD would close the gap that the grouping exploits, and the paper offers no theoretical guarantee against that.
  • Inference: the maximized forgetting term could serve as a general student-side unlearning primitive for synthetic data whenever the teacher is suspected of encoding undesired domain knowledge.
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Editorial analysis

A structured set of objections, weighed in public.

Desk editor's note, referee report, and a circularity audit.

Referee Report

3 major / 6 minor

Summary. The paper studies data-free knowledge distillation (DFKD) from non-transferable learning (NTL) teachers, i.e., teachers trained so that knowledge transfer from an in-distribution (ID) domain to an out-of-distribution (OOD) domain is deliberately restricted. The authors identify an 'OOD trap': when distilling NTL teachers, the generator produces synthetic samples that mix ID and OOD content, the student learns misleading OOD knowledge, and ID accuracy suffers. They propose Adversarial Trap Escaping (ATEsc), a plug-and-play module that splits each synthetic batch by PGD-based label-flip robustness: fragile samples are treated as ID-like and used for knowledge distillation, while robust samples are treated as OOD-like and used as negative examples for a forgetting term. Experiments cover close-set NTL, open-set NTL, and NTL-based backdoor settings across three DFKD baselines and multiple architectures. The results show that calibrated distillation (+CKD) usually improves ID accuracy, and the full ATEsc additionally reduces OOD transfer/ASR, although often at the cost of ID accuracy relative to +CKD.

Significance. If the proposed mechanism is validated, this is a useful contribution: it is the first systematic study of DFKD from NTL teachers, it identifies a concrete and reproducible failure mode (the OOD trap), and it offers a simple plug-and-play remedy that works across several baselines and settings. The adversarial-robustness-based grouping is a clever, falsifiable hypothesis, and the paper provides extensive experiments, toy illustrations, and released code. However, the evidence for the specific domain-based mechanism is incomplete: the grouping rule in Eq. (11) is never directly validated against ground-truth domain membership on synthetic samples, and the abstract overstates the ID-performance benefit, since the forgetting term frequently lowers ID accuracy relative to CKD alone. The significance of the paper therefore depends on additional experiments that separate the proposed domain-filtering explanation from low-confidence/low-quality filtering.

major comments (3)
  1. [Abstract; Section 5.2; Tables 1 and 2] The abstract states that ATEsc 'significantly enhanc[es] the student's ID performance while effectively suppressing the transfer of misleading OOD knowledge', but the tables do not support the first half when ATEsc is compared with +CKD. For example, Table 2 shows DFQ SVHN→CIFAR10 IAcc dropping from 89.0 to 88.1, NAYER SVHN→CIFAR10 dropping from 91.2 to 89.2, and DFQ CIFAR10→Digits dropping from 68.5 to 60.3; Table 1 shows CMI SVHN→MNIST-M dropping from 89.8 to 58.7. Section 5.2 itself concedes that ATEsc 'also sacrify some ID performance.' The defensible claim is that CKD improves ID transfer while the forgetting term trades ID accuracy for lower OOD transfer/ASR; the abstract and contribution bullets should be reworded accordingly.
  2. [Section 4.2, Eq. (11); Appendix C.5; Appendix E.7] The central grouping criterion is not validated as a domain classifier on synthetic data. Appendix C.5 establishes that real ID and real OOD samples differ in PGD robustness, and Appendix E.7 shows t-SNE alignment, but no experiment measures the agreement between Eq. (11)'s fragile/robust assignment and a ground-truth domain label for synthetic samples. Because synthetic samples have no known domain label, the observed improvements could come from removing low-confidence or low-quality samples rather than OOD-like ones. The ID drops when the forgetting term is added (e.g., Table 2: CMI SVHN→CIFAR10 91.3→72.0; NAYER CIFAR10→Digits 61.2→59.0) are exactly the signature expected if the robust group contains nontrivial ID-like content. Please add a controlled test that compares Eq. (11) against an entropy/confidence filter on the same synthetic batches, or that measures precision on synthetic samples of known provenance, to establish that domain, not sample quality, drives the gains.
  3. [Appendix E.2; Section 4.2] The perturbation bound epsilon is load-bearing for the method, yet the main text does not report the value used for Tables 1–3. Appendix E.2 shows that for DFQ+ATEsc on CIFAR10→STL10, decreasing epsilon causes a large drop in OAcc (Figure 41), and for CIFAR10→Digits, larger epsilon monotonically improves OOD resistance (Figure 42). Since Eq. (11) partitions samples by exactly this threshold, the paper should state the default epsilon, report the sweep for all main configurations, and either justify a single value or show that the main conclusions are stable over a range.
minor comments (6)
  1. [Abstract] The abstract contains grammatical errors: 'without access the real in-distribution data' and 'NTL teachers fool DFKD through divert the generator's attention' should be rewritten.
  2. [Section 5.2] The phrase 'it also sacrify some ID performance' is a typo; it should read 'it also sacrifices some ID performance.'
  3. [Table 3] Several ATEsc cells have very large standard deviations, e.g., NAYER + ATEsc on BadNet(sq) reports ASR 34.6±47.3. The paper should discuss whether these differences are statistically meaningful, since the interval spans nearly the full range of the baseline.
  4. [Section 5.1] For close-set NTL, higher OOD accuracy is interpreted as 'better resistance to misleading OOD knowledge transfer,' but since ID and OOD share the label space, OOD accuracy under true labels could also be read as beneficial generalization. This conflation should be clarified when the metric is introduced.
  5. [Appendix E.1] The implementation details do not state the number of random seeds used for the reported means and standard deviations; this information should be added.
  6. [Figure 1] The y-axis labels in Figures 1(c)–(e) appear as concatenated numbers without separators (e.g., '1316191121'); they should be formatted as a normal tick sequence.

Circularity Check

0 steps flagged · score 0.0 of 10

No significant circularity: ATEsc's robustness-based grouping is not fitted to its target IAcc/ASR metrics, and the central mechanism is validated on held-out real ID/OOD data rather than defined by the reported results.

full rationale

The paper's central claim—that NTL teachers impose an OOD trap on DFKD and that filtering synthetic samples by PGD label-flip robustness helps escape it—does not reduce by construction to its own outputs. The grouping criterion in Eq. 11 uses only the teacher's prediction change under PGD; it does not use student ID accuracy, OOD accuracy, or attack success rate. The premise that NTL teachers are fragile on real ID data and robust on real OOD data is established independently on held-out real samples (Fig. 6 and Appendices C.5–C.7), with additional ablations on NTL training objectives (Appendix C.6), rather than being inferred from the final student metrics. The calibrated KD loss (Eq. 12) and forgetting loss (Eq. 13) are optimization objectives evaluated externally on real test sets, not fitted predictors of those test metrics. Self-citations to prior NTL work by the same group appear in background and related-work discussions (e.g., Hong et al. 2024a,b; Hong et al. 2025), but no load-bearing uniqueness theorem or ansatz is imported from those citations; the core NTL formulation is cited to Wang et al. 2022. The skeptical concern that Eq. 11 is not directly validated against ground-truth domain labels on synthetic samples is a legitimate empirical-validation and possible-confound issue, but it is not an instance of a prediction being equivalent to its input by definition. Therefore no circular step is established, and the appropriate circularity score is 0.

Assumptions & free parameters 3 free parameters · 3 assumptions · 0 invented entities

The method introduces two tunable hyperparameters (epsilon and lambda) and relies on an empirical premise that PGD label-flips separate ID-like from OOD-like synthetic data. No new entities are postulated. The NTL training itself follows prior work, and the DFKD baselines are standard.

free parameters (3)
  • epsilon (adversarial perturbation bound) = not specified in main text; varied in Appendix E.2 (e.g., 4, 8, 16)
    Controls the PGD attack radius in Eq. 10 and directly determines the split into fragile vs robust groups. The paper shows results vary with epsilon, and the choice is made per task.
  • lambda (forgetting loss weight) = not specified in main text; varied in Appendix E.3 from 1e-7 to 1e-2
    Weights the forgetting term in Eq. 14. The paper reports sensitivity to lambda, and the final value is chosen by hyperparameter search.
  • PGD attack steps = not specified in main text; figures show 0-5 steps
    Number of PGD iterations used in the grouping step is a tunable that affects robustness measurement.
assumptions (3)
  • domain assumption OOD-domain samples are far from decision boundaries because NTL training maximizes output and feature discrepancy (Eqs. 2-3), making them adversarially robust.
    Stated in Section 4.1 and verified empirically in Appendix C.5, but not proven. This is the core premise of the grouping rule.
  • domain assumption Synthetic samples whose predicted label changes under untargeted PGD are ID-like; samples whose label remains stable are OOD-like.
    Used in Eq. 11 to split the batch. The paper verifies this on real ID/OOD data but not on all synthetic samples; Appendix E.2 shows sensitivity to epsilon.
  • domain assumption The BatchNorm statistics of an NTL teacher are a mixture of ID and OOD distributions, and the BN loss in DFKD pulls the generator toward OOD-like samples.
    Proposed as the mechanism for the OOD trap in Section 3.2 and Appendix C.4. It is supported by toy experiments and visualizations, but is an explanatory model rather than a proven necessity.

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Cite this review

Pith. "Pith review of When Data-Free Knowledge Distillation Meets Non-Transferable Teacher: Escaping Out-of-Distribution Trap is All You Need." pith.science (2026). https://pith.science/paper/HI4236PB

@misc{pith2026250704119,
  author       = {Pith},
  title        = {Pith review of: When Data-Free Knowledge Distillation Meets Non-Transferable Teacher: Escaping Out-of-Distribution Trap is All You Need},
  year         = {2026},
  howpublished = {\url{https://pith.science/paper/HI4236PB}},
  note         = {Machine review of arXiv:2507.04119}
}
read the original abstract

Data-free knowledge distillation (DFKD) transfers knowledge from a teacher to a student without access the real in-distribution (ID) data. Its common solution is to use a generator to synthesize fake data and use them as a substitute for real ID data. However, existing works typically assume teachers are trustworthy, leaving the robustness and security of DFKD from untrusted teachers largely unexplored. In this work, we conduct the first investigation into distilling non-transferable learning (NTL) teachers using DFKD, where the transferability from an ID domain to an out-of-distribution (OOD) domain is prohibited. We find that NTL teachers fool DFKD through divert the generator's attention from the useful ID knowledge to the misleading OOD knowledge. This hinders ID knowledge transfer but prioritizes OOD knowledge transfer. To mitigate this issue, we propose Adversarial Trap Escaping (ATEsc) to benefit DFKD by identifying and filtering out OOD-like synthetic samples. Specifically, inspired by the evidence that NTL teachers show stronger adversarial robustness on OOD samples than ID samples, we split synthetic samples into two groups according to their robustness. The fragile group is treated as ID-like data and used for normal knowledge distillation, while the robust group is seen as OOD-like data and utilized for forgetting OOD knowledge. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of ATEsc for improving DFKD against NTL teachers. Code is released at https://github.com/tmllab/2025_ICML_ATEsc.

Figures

Figures reproduced from arXiv: 2507.04119 by the authors.

Figure 1
Figure 1. (a) The adversarial exploration framework of data-free knowledge distillation (DFKD). (b) For the SL teacher pre-trained on ID domain Did, the synthetic distirbution Ds is close to the real Did. However, for the NTL teacher pre-trained on both Did and out-of-distribution data Dood, OOD trap effect leads to the shift of Ds from Did toward Dood. (c-e) A comparison of training dynamics of distilling SL and NTL teachers… view at source ↗
Figure 2
Figure 2. Synthetic samples of CMI on SL and NTL teacher. (a) DFQ (b) CMI [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p004_2.png] view at source ↗
Figure 3
Figure 3. Feature distribution (NTL: SVHN→CIFAR10). Green dots and red dots represent real ID and OOD domain samples, re￾spectively. Purple transparent dots represent the synthetic samples. where DKL is the KL divergence to measure the distribu￾tion difference, n represents a noise vector sampled from a predefined noise distribution Dnoise. Then, the synthesized samples are leveraged to teach the student S to mimic the teache… view at source ↗
Figures from the paper (46 more)
Figure 4
Figure 4. Figure 4: Downstream applications of NTL’s OOD trap effect to DFKD: (a) NTL teachers defend against data-free model extraction (DFME); (b-c) NTL teachers transfer backdoor to students via data-free knowledge distillation. ID-to-OOD synthetic distribution shift means the syn￾thet…
Figure 5
Figure 5. Figure 5: We use green and red denotes ID and OOD domain data. (a): The decision boundaries cannot separate the lp-balls around the data points of ID domain. (b) The lp-balls around the OOD data points are far away from the decision boundaries. 0 20 40 60 80 100 0 1 2 3 4 5 Accu…
Figure 6
Figure 6. Figure 6: The difference of adversarial robustness (PGD with ϵ = 8) of the ID and OOD domain under different attack steps. students inheriting high attack success rate (ASR). Notably, the risk of backdoor transfer to students via DFKD was first observed in ABD (Hong et al., 2023…
Figure 7
Figure 7. Figure 7: Comparison of training dynamic of SL and NTL teachers. The OOD accuracy is calculated between the student’s predictions and OOD-class labels. This directly show the degree of OOD misleading knowledge transfer from teachers to students. 0 20 40 60 80 100 1 31 61 91 121 …
Figure 8
Figure 8. Figure 8: Comparison of the training dynamic of the SL and NTL teachers on close-set tasks. We directly show the OOD accuracy from the student’s predictions to true data labels. This can directly reflect the generalization ability from ID to OOD domain. C.2. Visualization of Syn…
Figure 9
Figure 9. Figure 9: Samples from involved datasets. (a) Clean (b) BadNets(sq) (c) BadNets(grid) (d) Blended (e) Sig [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p018_9.png]
Figure 10
Figure 10. Figure 10: (d)). (a) MNIST (b) USPS (c) SVHN (d) MNIST-M (e) SYN-D (f) CIFAR10 (g) STL10 [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p018_10.png]
Figure 11
Figure 11. Figure 11: Comparison of synthetic samples (DFKD by CMI. T: ResNet34 and S: ResNet18). (a) SN→CIFAR10, ZSKT (b) SN→CIFAR10, DFQ (c) SN→CIFAR10, CMI (d) SN→CIFAR10, NAYER (e) CIFAR10→STL10, ZSKT (f) CIFAR10→STL10, DFQ (g) CIFAR10→STL10, CMI (h) CIFAR10→STL10, NAYER [PITH_FULL_IM…
Figure 12
Figure 12. Figure 12: t-SNE visualization of synthetic samples (T: ResNet34 and S: ResNet18). Green dots and red dots represent real ID and OOD domain samples, respectively. Purple transparent dots represent the synthetic samples. 18 [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p018_12.png]
Figure 13
Figure 13. Figure 13: Synthetic samples of CMI (w/ and w/o BN Loss) on a SL teacher (datasets: CIFAR10; archs: ResNet34→ResNet18). (a) NAYER w/ BN Loss (b) NAYER w/o BN Loss [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p020_13.png]
Figure 14
Figure 14. Figure 14: Synthetic samples of NAYER (w/ and w/o BN Loss) on a SL teacher (datasets: CIFAR10; archs: ResNet34→ResNet18). (a) CMI w/ BN Loss (b) CMI w/o BN Loss [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p020_14.png]
Figure 15
Figure 15. Figure 15: Synthetic samples of CMI (w/ and w/o BN Loss) on an NTL teacher (datasets: CIFAR10→Digits; ResNet34→ResNet18). 20 [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p020_15.png]
Figure 16
Figure 16. Figure 16: Synthetic samples of NAYER (w/ and w/o BN Loss) on an NTL teacher (datasets: CIFAR10→Digits; ResNet34→ResNet18). C.5. Adversarial Robustness for NTL Teachers In this section, we present more evidence related to the NTL teachers’ adversarial robustness difference on re…
Figure 17
Figure 17. Figure 17: Adversarial robustness (PGD) on ID and OOD domain. The NTL teacher is trained on SVHN→CIFAR10 with ResNet34. 0 20 40 60 80 100 0 1 2 3 4 5 Accuracy (%) steps ID OOD 0 20 40 60 80 100 0 1 2 3 4 5 Accuracy (%) steps ID OOD 0 20 40 60 80 100 0 1 2 3 4 5 Accuracy (%) step…
Figure 18
Figure 18. Figure 18: Adversarial robustness (PGD) on ID and OOD domain. The NTL teacher is trained on SVHN→CIFAR10 with VGG-13. 0 20 40 60 80 100 0 1 2 3 4 5 Accuracy (%) steps ID OOD 0 20 40 60 80 100 0 1 2 3 4 5 Accuracy (%) steps ID OOD 0 20 40 60 80 100 0 1 2 3 4 5 Accuracy (%) steps …
Figure 19
Figure 19. Figure 19: Adversarial robustness (PGD) on ID and OOD domain. The NTL teacher is trained on CIFAR10→Digits with ResNet34. 21 [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p021_19.png]
Figure 20
Figure 20. Figure 20: Adversarial robustness (PGD) on ID and OOD domain. The NTL teacher is trained on CIFAR10→Digits with VGG-13. 0 20 40 60 80 100 0 1 2 3 4 5 Accuracy (%) steps ID OOD 0 20 40 60 80 100 0 1 2 3 4 5 Accuracy (%) steps ID OOD 0 20 40 60 80 100 0 1 2 3 4 5 Accuracy (%) step…
Figure 21
Figure 21. Figure 21: Adversarial robustness (PGD) on ID and OOD domain. The NTL teacher is trained on CIFAR10→STL10 with ResNet34. 0 20 40 60 80 100 0 1 2 3 4 5 Accuracy (%) steps ID OOD 0 20 40 60 80 100 0 1 2 3 4 5 Accuracy (%) steps ID OOD 0 20 40 60 80 100 0 1 2 3 4 5 Accuracy (%) ste…
Figure 22
Figure 22. Figure 22: Adversarial robustness (PGD) on ID and OOD domain. The NTL teacher is trained on CIFAR10→STL10 with VGG-13. C.6. The Influence of NTL Training Objectives to Adversarial Robustness In this section, we further investigate the influence of each training objective in NTL …
Figure 23
Figure 23. Figure 23: Comparison of adversarial robustness of SL and NTL teachers (ResNet-34) against untargeted PGD attack (ϵ = 4) on close-set ID and OOD domain (ID: CIFAR10 and OOD: STL), where the accuracy reflects the consistency of predictive labels before and after untargeted advers…
Figure 24
Figure 24. Figure 24: Comparison of adversarial robustness of SL and NTL teachers (VGG-13) against untargeted PGD attack (ϵ = 4) on close-set ID and OOD domain (ID: CIFAR10 and OOD: STL), where the accuracy reflects the consistency of predictive labels before and after untargeted adversari…
Figure 25
Figure 25. Figure 25: Comparison of adversarial robustness of SL and NTL teachers (ResNet-34) against untargeted PGD attack (ϵ = 4) on open-set ID and OOD domain (ID: CIFAR10 and OOD: Digits), where the accuracy reflects the consistency of predictive labels before and after untargeted adve…
Figure 26
Figure 26. Figure 26: Comparison of adversarial robustness of SL and NTL teachers (VGG-13) against untargeted PGD attack (ϵ = 4) on open-set ID and OOD domain (ID: CIFAR10 and OOD: Digits), where the accuracy reflects the consistency of predictive labels before and after untargeted adversa…
Figure 27
Figure 27. Figure 27: The difference of adversarial robustness (PGD with ϵ = 4) on NTL-based backdoored teachers. The accuracy reflects the consistency of predictive labels before and after untargeted adversarial attack. 0 20 40 60 80 100 0 1 2 3 4 5 Accuracy (%) steps ID OOD 0 20 40 60 80…
Figure 28
Figure 28. Figure 28: The difference of adversarial robustness (PGD with ϵ = 4) on conventional backdoor teachers. The accuracy reflects the consistency of predictive labels before and after untargeted adversarial attack. 24 [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p024_28.png]
Figure 29
Figure 29. Figure 29: A toy experiment. As shown in [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p025_29.png]
Figure 30
Figure 30. Figure 30: Toy experiment for data-free knowledge distillation (w/ BN loss) on a SL teacher w/ BN layers. Red represent class 1, green represent class 2, and blue represent class 3 samples. Different symbols represent different domains: ◦ for ID domain and × for OOD domain. The …
Figure 31
Figure 31. Figure 31: Toy experiment for data-free knowledge distillation (w/ BN loss) on an NTL teacher w/ BN layers. 25 [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p025_31.png]
Figure 32
Figure 32. Figure 32: Toy experiment for data-free knowledge distillation (w/o BN loss) on an NTL teacher w/ BN layers (initial 1). (a) Epoch=1 (b) Epoch=401 (c) Epoch=801 (d) Epoch=1201 (e) Epoch=1601 [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p026_32.png]
Figure 33
Figure 33. Figure 33: Toy experiment for data-free knowledge distillation (w/o BN loss) on an NTL teacher w/ BN layers (initial 2). The effect of NTL components. In addition, we conduct DFKD experiments on different variants of NTL teachers, thus verifying the effect of different component…
Figure 34
Figure 34. Figure 34: Toy experiment for data-free knowledge distillation (w/o BN loss) on an NTL teacher w/ BN layers (initial 3). can be formulated as: LSL2domain = Lid + λcls · Lcls. (15) • NTL w/o MMD: revising NTL-cls by removing the MMD loss in feature space, which can be formulated …
Figure 35
Figure 35. Figure 35: Comparison of DFKD w/ BN loss across variants of teachers w/ BN layers (Epoch=1801) [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p027_35.png]
Figure 36
Figure 36. Figure 36: , and the results for NTL teacher (three runs with different initialization) are shown in Figures 37 to 39. From the results, although without the BN regularization, the student trained by the adversarial exploration can still learn correct ID knowledge from the SL te…
Figure 37
Figure 37. Figure 37: Toy experiment for data-free knowledge distillation (w/o BN loss) on an NTL teacher w/o BN layers (initial 1). 28 [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p028_37.png]
Figure 38
Figure 38. Figure 38: Toy experiment for data-free knowledge distillation (w/o BN loss) on an NTL teacher w/o BN layers (initial 2). (a) Epoch=1 (b) Epoch=401 (c) Epoch=801 (d) Epoch=1201 (e) Epoch=1601 [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p029_38.png]
Figure 39
Figure 39. Figure 39: Toy experiment for data-free knowledge distillation (w/o BN loss) on an NTL teacher w/o BN layers (initial 3). The effect of NTL components. In addition, we also investigate the effect of different variants of NTL teachers (the same as variants in Appendix D.1). Visua…
Figure 40
Figure 40. Figure 40: Comparison of DFKD w/o BN loss across variants of teachers w/o BN layers (Epoch=1801). 29 [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p029_40.png]
Figure 41
Figure 41. Figure 41: Hyperparamater analysis of ϵ. CIFAR10→STL10. T: ResNet34 and S: ResNet18. 0 20 40 60 80 100 2 4 8 16 32 Accuracy (%) IACC OLACC ϵ 0 20 40 60 80 100 2 4 8 16 32 Accuracy (%) IACC OLACC ϵ 0 20 40 60 80 100 2 4 8 16 32 Accuracy (%) IACC OLACC ϵ 0 20 40 60 80 100 2 4 8 16…
Figure 42
Figure 42. Figure 42: Hyperparamater analysis of ϵ. CIFAR10→Digits. T: ResNet34 and S: ResNet18. E.3. Analysis of Forgetting Loss To analyze the effect of forgetting loss, we change the weight of λ in Equation 14 from 10−7 to 10−2 and conduct experiments on a close-set task CIFAR10→STL10 a…
Figure 43
Figure 43. Figure 43: Hyperparamater analysis of λ. T: ResNet34 and S: ResNet18. E.4. Analysis of Adversarial Attack Method The PGD (Madry, 2017) attack in Equation 10 can be replaced with any adversarial attack method. In this section, we use FGSM (Goodfellow et al., 2014) to perform adve…
Figure 44
Figure 44. Figure 44: Comparison of synthetic samples before and after ATEsc (DFKD by NAYER. T: ResNet34 and S: ResNet18). Green dots and red dots represent real ID and OOD domain samples, respectively. Purple transparent dots represent the synthetic samples. (a) CIFAR10→STL10, NAYER (b) C…
Figure 45
Figure 45. Figure 45: Comparison of synthetic samples before and after ATEsc (DFKD by NAYER. T: ResNet34 and S: ResNet18). Green dots and red dots represent real ID and OOD domain samples, respectively. Purple transparent dots represent the synthetic samples. (a) CIFAR10→BadNet(grid) (b) C…
Figure 46
Figure 46. Figure 46: Comparison of synthetic samples before and after ATEsc (DFKD by NAYER. T: ResNet34 and S: ResNet18). Green dots and red dots represent real ID and OOD domain samples, respectively. Purple transparent dots represent the synthetic samples. Synthetic samples by using ATE…
Figure 47
Figure 47. Figure 47: Comparison of synthetic samples (CMI on NTL CIFAR10→Digits. T: ResNet34 and S: ResNet18). (a) NAYER w/o ATEsc (b) ID-like samples in ATEsc (c) OOD-like samples in ATEsc [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p035_47.png]
Figure 48
Figure 48. Figure 48: Comparison of synthetic samples (NAYER on NTL CIFAR10→Digits. T: ResNet34 and S: ResNet18). (a) CMI w/o ATEsc (b) ID-like samples in ATEsc (c) OOD-like samples in ATEsc [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p035_48.png]
Figure 49
Figure 49. Figure 49: Comparison of synthetic samples (CMI on NTL CIFAR10→Sig. T: ResNet34 and S: ResNet18). 35 [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p035_49.png]

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