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Best-of-Venom: Attacking RLHF by Injecting Poisoned Preference Data
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Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) is a popular method for aligning Language Models (LM) with human values and preferences. RLHF requires a large number of preference pairs as training data, which are often used in both the Supervised Fine-Tuning and Reward Model training and therefore publicly available datasets are commonly used. In this work, we study to what extent a malicious actor can manipulate the LMs generations by poisoning the preferences, i.e., injecting poisonous preference pairs into these datasets and the RLHF training process. We propose strategies to build poisonous preference pairs and test their performance by poisoning two widely used preference datasets. Our results show that preference poisoning is highly effective: injecting a small amount of poisonous data (1-5\% of the original dataset), we can effectively manipulate the LM to generate a target entity in a target sentiment (positive or negative). The findings from our experiments also shed light on strategies to defend against the preference poisoning attack.
Forward citations
Cited by 2 Pith papers
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BadReward: Clean-Label Poisoning of Reward Models in Text-to-Image RLHF
BadReward uses clean-label feature-collision images to poison CLIP-based reward models so that a text-to-image model produces target attributes (e.g., glasses, skin tone, blood) when the trigger phrase is present.
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A Systematic Review of Poisoning Attacks Against Large Language Models
A systematic review that organizes 65 LLM poisoning papers into a threat model with four attack specifications and generalized metrics.
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