Random Serial Dictatorship with Transfers
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classification
cs.GT
econ.TH
keywords
dictatorshiprandomserialindividualstransfersaccompaniedadaptallowed
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It is well known that Random Serial Dictatorship is strategy-proof and leads to a Pareto-Efficient outcome. We show that this result breaks down when individuals are allowed to make transfers, and adapt Random Serial Dictatorship to encompass trades between individuals. Strategic analysis of play under the new mechanisms we define is given, accompanied by simulations to quantify the gains from trade.
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