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Security Challenges in AI Agent Deployment: Insights from a Large Scale Public Competition

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arxiv 2507.20526 v1 pith:SGQOYMGN submitted 2025-07-28 cs.AI cs.CLcs.CY

classification cs.AIcs.CLcs.CY
keywords agentagentsdeploymentacrossaccessattackattacksbenchmark
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
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Recent advances have enabled LLM-powered AI agents to autonomously execute complex tasks by combining language model reasoning with tools, memory, and web access. But can these systems be trusted to follow deployment policies in realistic environments, especially under attack? To investigate, we ran the largest public red-teaming competition to date, targeting 22 frontier AI agents across 44 realistic deployment scenarios. Participants submitted 1.8 million prompt-injection attacks, with over 60,000 successfully eliciting policy violations such as unauthorized data access, illicit financial actions, and regulatory noncompliance. We use these results to build the Agent Red Teaming (ART) benchmark - a curated set of high-impact attacks - and evaluate it across 19 state-of-the-art models. Nearly all agents exhibit policy violations for most behaviors within 10-100 queries, with high attack transferability across models and tasks. Importantly, we find limited correlation between agent robustness and model size, capability, or inference-time compute, suggesting that additional defenses are needed against adversarial misuse. Our findings highlight critical and persistent vulnerabilities in today's AI agents. By releasing the ART benchmark and accompanying evaluation framework, we aim to support more rigorous security assessment and drive progress toward safer agent deployment.

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Cited by 2 Pith papers

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. Operational Reframing and Approval-Framed Delegation in Multi-Agent LLM Safety

    cs.AI 2026-07 conditional novelty 7.0 of 10

    Decomposing multi-agent LLM pipeline safety into operational reframing, planner behavior, and approval-framed delegation reveals that raw-direct model rankings mispredict deployed behavior.

  2. GPT-Red: Automated Red Teaming via Self-Play at Scale

    cs.CR 2026-07 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    A self-play-trained red-teaming agent, GPT-Red, discovers prompt injection attacks and is used to adversarially harden GPT-5.6, cutting attack success rates to near zero on several benchmarks.

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