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Jailbreaking Large Language Models Against Moderation Guardrails via Cipher Characters

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arxiv 2405.20413 v1 pith:SMY3HWJF submitted 2024-05-30 cs.CR cs.CLcs.CVcs.LG

classification cs.CRcs.CLcs.CVcs.LG
keywords moderationguardrailsjailbreakbypassllmstriggerbehaviorcharacters
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
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abstract

Large Language Models (LLMs) are typically harmless but remain vulnerable to carefully crafted prompts known as ``jailbreaks'', which can bypass protective measures and induce harmful behavior. Recent advancements in LLMs have incorporated moderation guardrails that can filter outputs, which trigger processing errors for certain malicious questions. Existing red-teaming benchmarks often neglect to include questions that trigger moderation guardrails, making it difficult to evaluate jailbreak effectiveness. To address this issue, we introduce JAMBench, a harmful behavior benchmark designed to trigger and evaluate moderation guardrails. JAMBench involves 160 manually crafted instructions covering four major risk categories at multiple severity levels. Furthermore, we propose a jailbreak method, JAM (Jailbreak Against Moderation), designed to attack moderation guardrails using jailbreak prefixes to bypass input-level filters and a fine-tuned shadow model functionally equivalent to the guardrail model to generate cipher characters to bypass output-level filters. Our extensive experiments on four LLMs demonstrate that JAM achieves higher jailbreak success ($\sim$ $\times$ 19.88) and lower filtered-out rates ($\sim$ $\times$ 1/6) than baselines.

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Cited by 3 Pith papers

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. "I Cannot Write This Because It Violates Our Content Policy": Understanding Content Moderation Policies and User Experiences in Generative AI Products

    cs.HC 2025-06 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    GAI tools' content moderation policies are comprehensive in scope but thin on user reporting and appeals, and Reddit users report frequent frustration with opaque moderation decisions.

  2. InfoFlood: Jailbreaking Large Language Models with Information Overload

    cs.CR 2025-06 conditional novelty 5.0 of 10

    InfoFlood claims near-perfect jailbreak success on four frontier LLMs by rewriting harmful queries into verbose academic prose with fake citations, past-tense framing, and ethical disclaimers, without adversarial suffixes.

  3. From Hallucinations to Jailbreaks: Rethinking the Vulnerability of Large Foundation Models

    cs.CV 2025-05 reject novelty 3.0 of 10

    The paper argues hallucinations and jailbreaks share the same optimization dynamics and shows that defenses for one also reduce the other, but the theoretical support is largely circular.

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