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arxiv: 2605.12535 · v2 · pith:XCIRARNGnew · submitted 2026-05-02 · 💻 cs.CR

Ghost in the Context: Measuring Policy-Carriage Failures in Decision-Time Assembly

Pith reviewed 2026-05-20 23:25 UTC · model grok-4.3

classification 💻 cs.CR
keywords LLM agentscontext assemblypolicy-carriage failuresSafeContextdecision-time controltruncationsummarizationagent security
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The pith

Decision-time context assembly is a measurable part of the LLM control path that can be partially hardened.

A machine-rendered reading of the paper's core claim, the machinery that carries it, and where it could break.

LLM agents operate on an assembled decision state rather than raw history, using steps like truncation and summarization to bound the input. The paper demonstrates that losing or weakening policy directives during this assembly can cause policy violations without any external tampering. By testing on multiple open-weight models and proposing SafeContext to pin and reuse control information, it shows these failures are consistent but can be reduced to some extent. The gains are modest and depend on the type of compaction applied to the context. This positions context assembly as a controllable element in maintaining agent policy adherence.

Core claim

LLM agents do not act on raw interaction history; they act on a bounded decision state assembled by truncation, summarization, reordering, and rewriting. If directive-bearing state is dropped, weakened, or rebound during that step, an agent can cross a policy boundary without prompt override, model changes, or persistent-memory compromise. The study measures this over several models using exact constraint respect judgments and audits of state visibility. SafeContext, which pins control state and reuses prefixes while keeping weights fixed, yields partial mitigation that is stronger against simple truncation than against structured compaction. The same assembly failure pattern appears in the

What carries the argument

SafeContext, a control layer that pins control state, reuses retained control prefixes, and optionally injects reminders under pressure while keeping model weights fixed.

Load-bearing premise

The judged exact constraint respect and direct audits of assembled-state visibility accurately isolate failures caused by assembly rather than other model behaviors or prompt effects.

What would settle it

A test where policy violations occur at the same rate despite perfect retention of all directive state in the assembled context would show that assembly is not the source of the failures.

Figures

Figures reproduced from arXiv: 2605.12535 by Igor Santos-Grueiro.

Figure 1
Figure 1. Figure 1: shows the subsystem under study: directive-bearing and non-control state compete under pressure before action time. 2.2 The Adversarial Scheduler The adversary controls scheduling pressure over visible interaction history: how much non-control content appears, where it appears, and how directive-bearing state is separated or framed. That pres￾sure changes what survives truncation, how summaries rewrite ear… view at source ↗
Figure 2
Figure 2. Figure 2: Failure traces from input history to decision state [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p003_2.png] view at source ↗
Figure 3
Figure 3. Figure 3: Control-layer intervention for decision-time context assembly: directive-bearing state is explicitly mediated before [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p004_3.png] view at source ↗
Figure 4
Figure 4. Figure 4: C1 unmitigated risk profile by model and attack [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p007_4.png] view at source ↗
Figure 5
Figure 5. Figure 5: C2: Mean ΔECR (blue) and ΔDFR (orange) versus matched truncation for each mitigation variant. The panels show eviction, aliasing, and binding instability. Labels are explicit (e.g., SCP+ICE (A), SCP+Cache (O)), where A/O denote autonomous/oracle routing [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p008_5.png] view at source ↗
Figure 6
Figure 6. Figure 6: Prefix of the reconstructed decision state in the frozen agentic case. Left: unmitigated truncation begins directly inside [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p010_6.png] view at source ↗
Figure 7
Figure 7. Figure 7: C3 heterogeneity profile by mitigation variant and [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p010_7.png] view at source ↗
Figure 8
Figure 8. Figure 8: CSR by input-token pressure bin for the unmitigated path (dashed) and SCP+ICE (A) (solid), shown per model with [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p011_8.png] view at source ↗
Figure 9
Figure 9. Figure 9: C4: Cost-benefit profile by mitigation family. Left: [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p011_9.png] view at source ↗
read the original abstract

LLM agents do not act on raw interaction history; they act on a bounded decision state assembled by truncation, summarization, reordering, and rewriting. If directive-bearing state is dropped, weakened, or rebound during that step, an agent can cross a policy boundary without prompt override, model changes, or persistent-memory compromise. We study this failure mode over local Llama 3.1 8B, Qwen 2.5 7B, and Mistral 7B using judged exact constraint respect and direct audits of assembled-state visibility. We evaluate SafeContext, a control layer that pins control state, reuses retained control prefixes, and optionally injects reminders under pressure while keeping model weights fixed. Unmitigated risk is systematic, but absolute exact compliance remains low. Against truncation, SafeContext yields small gains; against a strong structured-compaction policy, most aggregate lift disappears, leaving residual benefit mainly in overflow eviction and selected aliasing slices. Replay-only does not explain the effect. A larger-model extension on Qwen 14B and Llama 70B shows the same failure object under larger models, although sign and magnitude remain policy-conditional. Decision-time context assembly is therefore a measurable part of the control path that can be partially hardened.

Editorial analysis

A structured set of objections, weighed in public.

Desk editor's note, referee report, simulated authors' rebuttal, and a circularity audit. Tearing a paper down is the easy half of reading it; the pith above is the substance, this is the friction.

Referee Report

2 major / 2 minor

Summary. The paper claims that LLM agents can violate policies due to failures in decision-time context assembly (truncation, summarization, reordering, rewriting) even without prompt overrides or model changes. It measures this risk via judged exact constraint respect and direct audits on Llama 3.1 8B, Qwen 2.5 7B, and Mistral 7B, evaluates SafeContext as a mitigation that pins control state and injects reminders, reports systematic unmitigated risk with low absolute compliance, small gains against truncation that largely vanish under strong structured-compaction, and similar patterns on larger models (Qwen 14B, Llama 70B). The conclusion is that decision-time assembly is a measurable and partially hardenable part of the control path.

Significance. If the empirical measurements correctly isolate assembly-induced carriage failures, the work identifies a previously under-examined control surface in agentic LLM systems and demonstrates that lightweight, weight-fixed interventions can yield policy-conditional improvements. The larger-model extension and comparison across compaction policies add breadth, though the absence of quantitative results, baselines, and error bars in the provided abstract constrains evaluation of effect sizes and robustness.

major comments (2)
  1. [§4] §4 (Evaluation Methodology): The central attribution of observed policy-carriage failures to assembly operations (truncation, summarization, etc.) rests on 'judged exact constraint respect' and 'direct audits of assembled-state visibility' without an explicit baseline that supplies the identical directive set in full, unassembled history under otherwise identical conditions. This leaves open the possibility that measured drops reflect base-model non-compliance or prompt sensitivity rather than assembly-specific effects, directly undermining the claim that assembly is a distinct measurable part of the control path.
  2. [Abstract, §5] Abstract and §5 (Results): Absolute exact compliance remains low even with SafeContext, and most aggregate lift disappears under strong structured-compaction. Without reported quantitative values, error bars, or baseline comparisons, it is unclear whether the residual benefits in overflow eviction and aliasing slices are statistically meaningful or sufficient to support the 'partially hardened' conclusion.
minor comments (2)
  1. Clarify the exact prompting and judgment protocol used for 'judged exact constraint respect' (e.g., judge model, few-shot examples, inter-annotator agreement) so readers can assess reliability.
  2. Provide the precise definitions and examples of the 'strong structured-compaction policy' versus truncation to allow replication of the policy-conditional results.

Simulated Author's Rebuttal

2 responses · 0 unresolved

We thank the referee for the thoughtful and detailed report. We address each major comment below, providing clarifications on our methodology and indicating the revisions we will make to strengthen the manuscript.

read point-by-point responses
  1. Referee: [§4] §4 (Evaluation Methodology): The central attribution of observed policy-carriage failures to assembly operations (truncation, summarization, etc.) rests on 'judged exact constraint respect' and 'direct audits of assembled-state visibility' without an explicit baseline that supplies the identical directive set in full, unassembled history under otherwise identical conditions. This leaves open the possibility that measured drops reflect base-model non-compliance or prompt sensitivity rather than assembly-specific effects, directly undermining the claim that assembly is a distinct measurable part of the control path.

    Authors: We appreciate the referee's emphasis on isolating assembly-specific effects. Our direct audits of assembled-state visibility explicitly check for the presence, binding, and integrity of directive tokens in the final context passed to the model. Violations where the constraint remains visible are attributed to model behavior, while absences or alterations are attributed to assembly. This provides a per-instance decomposition rather than relying solely on aggregate compliance. That said, we agree that an explicit no-assembly baseline (full directive history without truncation or compaction) would offer a cleaner contrast. We will add a supplementary experiment in revised §4 using shorter histories that fit without assembly to quantify the incremental effect of assembly operations. revision: partial

  2. Referee: [Abstract, §5] Abstract and §5 (Results): Absolute exact compliance remains low even with SafeContext, and most aggregate lift disappears under strong structured-compaction. Without reported quantitative values, error bars, or baseline comparisons, it is unclear whether the residual benefits in overflow eviction and aliasing slices are statistically meaningful or sufficient to support the 'partially hardened' conclusion.

    Authors: We agree that the abstract and §5 would benefit from explicit numerical reporting. While §5 contains per-policy compliance figures and comparisons, we will revise the abstract to include key quantitative results (e.g., exact compliance rates for baseline vs. SafeContext under truncation and structured-compaction) together with standard errors from repeated runs. We will also add a summary table of effect sizes and baseline contrasts. These changes will make clear that residual gains are concentrated in specific slices such as overflow eviction and remain consistent though modest, supporting the 'partially hardened' characterization without overstating absolute performance. revision: yes

Circularity Check

0 steps flagged

No significant circularity in empirical measurement study

full rationale

The paper presents an empirical evaluation of policy-carriage failures during decision-time context assembly in LLMs, using judged exact constraint respect and direct audits of assembled-state visibility across models such as Llama 3.1 8B, Qwen 2.5 7B, and Mistral 7B. It compares unmitigated risk against the SafeContext mitigation layer under truncation and structured-compaction policies, with extensions to larger models. No derivation chain, equations, fitted parameters renamed as predictions, or self-referential definitions are present; the central claim that decision-time assembly is a measurable and partially harden-able part of the control path follows directly from the reported experimental observations and comparisons rather than reducing to inputs by construction. Any self-citations are not load-bearing for the core findings, and the work remains self-contained as a standard measurement study without circular reduction.

Axiom & Free-Parameter Ledger

0 free parameters · 0 axioms · 0 invented entities

Abstract-only review yields no explicit free parameters, axioms, or invented entities; the contribution is framed as measurement and mitigation testing.

pith-pipeline@v0.9.0 · 5753 in / 1035 out tokens · 37310 ms · 2026-05-20T23:25:32.368848+00:00 · methodology

discussion (0)

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