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Jatmo: Prompt Injection Defense by Task-Specific Finetuning
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Large Language Models (LLMs) are attracting significant research attention due to their instruction-following abilities, allowing users and developers to leverage LLMs for a variety of tasks. However, LLMs are vulnerable to prompt-injection attacks: a class of attacks that hijack the model's instruction-following abilities, changing responses to prompts to undesired, possibly malicious ones. In this work, we introduce Jatmo, a method for generating task-specific models resilient to prompt-injection attacks. Jatmo leverages the fact that LLMs can only follow instructions once they have undergone instruction tuning. It harnesses a teacher instruction-tuned model to generate a task-specific dataset, which is then used to fine-tune a base model (i.e., a non-instruction-tuned model). Jatmo only needs a task prompt and a dataset of inputs for the task: it uses the teacher model to generate outputs. For situations with no pre-existing datasets, Jatmo can use a single example, or in some cases none at all, to produce a fully synthetic dataset. Our experiments on seven tasks show that Jatmo models provide similar quality of outputs on their specific task as standard LLMs, while being resilient to prompt injections. The best attacks succeeded in less than 0.5% of cases against our models, versus 87% success rate against GPT-3.5-Turbo. We release Jatmo at https://github.com/wagner-group/prompt-injection-defense.
Forward citations
Cited by 2 Pith papers
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The Task Shield: Enforcing Task Alignment to Defend Against Indirect Prompt Injection in LLM Agents
Task Shield cuts indirect prompt injection attack success to 2.07% on AgentDojo with GPT-4o by using an LLM to verify that each instruction and tool call contributes to the user's explicit goals.
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PromptShield: Deployable Detection for Prompt Injection Attacks
PromptShield reports a 65.3% true positive rate at 0.1% false positive rate for prompt injection detection, more than six times the best prior model, on its own out-of-distribution evaluation split.
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