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arxiv: 2010.13155 · v1 · pith:YUZ7K3EN · submitted 2020-10-25 · cs.CR · cs.AR

Security Assessment of Interposer-based Chiplet Integration

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classification cs.CR cs.AR
keywords interposer-baseddesignintegrationsecuritychipletscorestagestime
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With transistor scaling reaching its limits, interposer-based integration of dies (chiplets) is gaining traction. Such an interposer-based integration enables finer and tighter interconnect pitch than traditional system-on-packages and offers two key benefits: 1. It reduces design-to-market time by bypassing the time-consuming process of verification and fabrication. 2. It reduces the design cost by reusing chiplets. While black-boxing of the slow design stages cuts down the design time, it raises significant security concerns. We study the security implications of the emerging interposer-based integration methodology. The black-boxed design stages deploy security measures against hardware Trojans, reverse engineering, and intellectual property piracy in traditional systems-on-chip (SoC) designs and hence are not suitable for interposer-based integration. We propose using functionally diverse chiplets to detect and thwart hardware Trojans and use the inherent logic redundancy to shore up anti-piracy measures. Our proposals do not rely on access to the black-box design stages. We evaluate the security, time and cost benefits of our plan by implementing a MIPS processor, a DCT core, and an AES core using various IPs from the Xilinx CORE GENERATOR IP catalog, on an interposer-based Xilinx FPGA.

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