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Beyond Boundaries: A Comprehensive Survey of Transferable Attacks on AI Systems

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arxiv 2311.11796 v2 pith:Z7FLMSHI submitted 2023-11-20 cs.CR cs.AIcs.CLcs.CV

classification cs.CRcs.AIcs.CLcs.CV
keywords attackstransferablesystemsacrosscomprehensivecriticaldatamodel
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
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As Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems increasingly underpin critical applications, from autonomous vehicles to biometric authentication, their vulnerability to transferable attacks presents a growing concern. These attacks, designed to generalize across instances, domains, models, tasks, modalities, or even hardware platforms, pose severe risks to security, privacy, and system integrity. This survey delivers the first comprehensive review of transferable attacks across seven major categories, including evasion, backdoor, data poisoning, model stealing, model inversion, membership inference, and side-channel attacks. We introduce a unified six-dimensional taxonomy: cross-instance, cross-domain, cross-modality, cross-model, cross-task, and cross-hardware, which systematically captures the diverse transfer pathways of adversarial strategies. Through this framework, we examine both the underlying mechanics and practical implications of transferable attacks on AI systems. Furthermore, we review cutting-edge methods for enhancing attack transferability, organized around data augmentation and optimization strategies. By consolidating fragmented research and identifying critical future directions, this work provides a foundational roadmap for understanding, evaluating, and defending against transferable threats in real-world AI systems.

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Cited by 2 Pith papers

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. Images in Motion?: A First Look into Video Leakage in Collaborative Deep Learning

    cs.CV 2025-09 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    Gradient inversion recovers low-resolution frames from single-sample video gradients in federated learning, and super-resolution modestly improves fidelity against originals, while feature extractors resist the attack...

  2. Securing Deep Learning Hardware: A Survey of Side-Channel Vulnerabilities and Countermeasures

    cs.CR 2026-07 accept novelty 3.0 of 10

    Hardware side-channel attacks can recover deep-learning model architecture, parameters and inputs; this survey taxonomizes the leaks, attacks and countermeasures.

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