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Do We Really Need Curated Malicious Data for Safety Alignment in Multi-modal Large Language Models?

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arxiv 2504.10000 v1 pith:HXN6OIL6 submitted 2025-04-14 cs.CR cs.AIcs.CLcs.CVcs.LG

classification cs.CRcs.AIcs.CLcs.CVcs.LG
keywords safetyalignmentdatamulti-modalmllmsdatasetfinetuninglanguage
verification ladder T0 review T1 audit T2 compute T3 formal
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Multi-modal large language models (MLLMs) have made significant progress, yet their safety alignment remains limited. Typically, current open-source MLLMs rely on the alignment inherited from their language module to avoid harmful generations. However, the lack of safety measures specifically designed for multi-modal inputs creates an alignment gap, leaving MLLMs vulnerable to vision-domain attacks such as typographic manipulation. Current methods utilize a carefully designed safety dataset to enhance model defense capability, while the specific knowledge or patterns acquired from the high-quality dataset remain unclear. Through comparison experiments, we find that the alignment gap primarily arises from data distribution biases, while image content, response quality, or the contrastive behavior of the dataset makes little contribution to boosting multi-modal safety. To further investigate this and identify the key factors in improving MLLM safety, we propose finetuning MLLMs on a small set of benign instruct-following data with responses replaced by simple, clear rejection sentences. Experiments show that, without the need for labor-intensive collection of high-quality malicious data, model safety can still be significantly improved, as long as a specific fraction of rejection data exists in the finetuning set, indicating the security alignment is not lost but rather obscured during multi-modal pretraining or instruction finetuning. Simply correcting the underlying data bias could narrow the safety gap in the vision domain.

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Forward citations

Cited by 2 Pith papers

Reviewed papers in the Pith corpus that reference this work. Sorted by Pith novelty score. Full citation record

  1. Test-Time Immunization: A Universal Defense Framework Against Jailbreaks for (Multimodal) Large Language Models

    cs.CR 2025-05 conditional novelty 6.0 of 10

    TIM detects jailbreaks at test time using a gist-token classifier and adaptively fine-tunes the model with LoRA on detected harmful prompts, cutting attack success rates to near zero on tested benchmarks.

  2. A Comprehensive Survey on Trustworthiness in Reasoning with Large Language Models

    cs.CL 2025-09 conditional novelty 4.0 of 10

    A structured literature survey concluding that reasoning capabilities do not automatically make LLMs more trustworthy and can introduce new vulnerabilities in safety, robustness, and privacy.

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