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arxiv: 2606.21037 · v1 · pith:CPTZ2R34new · submitted 2026-06-19 · 💻 cs.CR · cs.CL

Honeyquest for LLMs: Rethinking Cyber Deception for AI Attackers

Kerri Prinos , Lilianne Brush , Cameron Denton This is my paper

Pith reviewed 2026-06-26 14:17 UTC · model grok-4.3

classification 💻 cs.CR cs.CL
keywords cyber deceptionLLM attackersHoneyquestrecognition-action gapreconnaissance queriesAI securitydeceptive trapsautonomous attackers
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The pith

LLM attackers fall for deceptive traps at higher rates than humans and exploit them despite recognizing the traps 73.4 percent of the time.

A machine-rendered reading of the paper's core claim, the machinery that carries it, and where it could break.

The paper adapts the Honeyquest instrument into an automated framework to measure how LLM agents judge cyber deception on reconnaissance tasks. It compares responses from 21 models across 10,962 trials against a 47-person human baseline on the same 174 queries. All models in the cohort fell for traps more often than humans, and the attention-diversion effect that helps human defenders was absent in the LLMs. Models could state in their reasoning that a trap was present yet still chose to exploit the deceptive elements in 73.4 percent of cases, with no correlation between stated recognition and actual behavior. The results indicate that deception tactics built on human psychology do not transfer to AI attackers.

Core claim

Every model in the 21-LLM cohort falls for deceptive traps at a significantly higher rate than human attackers. The defensive attention-diversion effect observed in humans is statistically absent in the LLM cohort. A critical recognition-action gap exists where LLMs successfully articulate trap recognition in their reasoning but exploit the deceptive elements anyway 73.4 percent of the time, and trap recognition in reasoning text did not predict fell-for-trap behavior across models (Spearman r = +0.08, p = 0.73). These findings show that human-centered deception hypotheses do not reliably transfer to AI attackers.

What carries the argument

The automated evaluation framework adapted from the Honeyquest instrument that presents identical reconnaissance queries to LLMs and records both reasoning text and final actions on deceptive traps.

If this is right

  • Deception strategies calibrated to human attention and judgment will be less effective against autonomous LLM attackers.
  • LLM agents form a distinct attacker class whose behavior cannot be assumed to match human patterns.
  • Recognition of deception in an LLM's chain-of-thought does not reliably prevent the model from acting on the deception.
  • Active defense research must develop AI-native frameworks rather than relying on human-centered hypotheses.

Where Pith is reading between the lines

These are editorial extensions of the paper, not claims the author makes directly.

  • Defenders may need to generate and test bait content specifically against LLM reasoning traces instead of human-like scenarios.
  • The recognition-action gap could be tested by inserting explicit instructions in prompts that force LLMs to avoid recognized traps.
  • If the gap persists across tasks beyond reconnaissance, it may affect how LLMs handle other forms of social engineering or misinformation.

Load-bearing premise

The 174 reconnaissance queries and the adapted Honeyquest instrument provide a valid, comparable measure of attacker judgment that can be directly transferred from the human baseline to LLM agents without substantial task or context mismatch.

What would settle it

A follow-up experiment that applies a different set of deception queries or a revised instrument and finds either no difference in trap exploitation rates between LLMs and humans or a strong negative correlation between trap recognition in reasoning and actual exploitation behavior.

Figures

Figures reproduced from arXiv: 2606.21037 by Cameron Denton, Kerri Prinos, Lilianne Brush.

Figure 1
Figure 1. Figure 1: System prompt issued to every model in the cohort. Each query appends a numbered line listing of an artifact (file system, .htaccess, HTTP response, or HTTP request log); the model returns exploit_marks, trap_marks, and reasoning via a submit_marks tool call. 3.2 LLM Attackers We assessed 21 models from 10 providers ( [PITH_FULL_IMAGE:figures/full_fig_p006_1.png] view at source ↗
Figure 2
Figure 2. Figure 2: Fell-for-trap rate by artifact type across the 21-LLM cohort and the human baseline. Light dots: individual LLMs. Solid bar: LLM aggregate. Dashed bar: human baseline from [28]. The relative ordering is consistent between LLMs and humans, but LLM rates exceed the human baseline by nearly 2× across every query type. HTTP response containing the injected X-ApiServer header trap (CDT DP3, 88.9% of models fell… view at source ↗
Figure 3
Figure 3. Figure 3: Recognition-action gap across the 21-LLM cohort. Open circles: how often the trap-naming code appears in reasoning (recognition). Filled circles: how often models fell for traps (action). The connector between circles represents the recognition-action gap. Sorted by recognition rate. Action clusters consistently above the human 37% baseline regardless of recognition, and recognition does not predict action… view at source ↗
Figure 4
Figure 4. Figure 4: Attention diversion (Aspect B2): per-paired-deception-technique ∆RR for hu￾mans (gray, from [28]) versus the LLM cohort (blue). Negative ∆RR indicates deception diverts attention from the underlying real risk (the defender benefit). The human aggre￾gate is −22% (p = 0.0013); the LLM cohort aggregate is +10% (n.s.). Only devtoken shows a significant diversion effect for LLMs (∆RR = −11%, p = 0.002). Asteris… view at source ↗
read the original abstract

The empirical foundation of cyber deception relies on human-centered hypotheses, but the rapid emergence of autonomous, AI-enabled attackers challenges whether this foundation transfers to AI agents. To address this, we introduce an automated evaluation framework adapted from the Honeyquest instrument to assess LLM attacker judgment at scale. Our 21-LLM cohort spanned 10 providers, diverse architectures and specializations, open- and closed-weight models, and parameter scales from 8B to over 1T. We evaluated the performance of this LLM cohort (yielding 10,962 responses) against the 47-participant human baseline across an identical set of 174 reconnaissance queries. Our empirical evaluation reveals three key findings that establish LLMs as a distinct attacker class: (1) every model in our cohort falls for deceptive traps at a significantly higher rate than human attackers; (2) the defensive attention-diversion effect observed in humans is statistically absent in our LLM cohort; and (3) a critical recognition-action gap, where LLMs successfully articulate trap recognition in their reasoning but exploit the deceptive elements anyway 73.4\% of the time. Across the 21 models, trap recognition in reasoning text did not predict fell-for-trap behavior (Spearman $r = +0.08$, $p = 0.73$). Ultimately, these findings demonstrate that human-centered deception hypotheses do not reliably transfer to AI attackers, highlighting the critical need for new research into AI-native active defense frameworks.

Editorial analysis

A structured set of objections, weighed in public.

Desk editor's note, referee report, simulated authors' rebuttal, and a circularity audit. Tearing a paper down is the easy half of reading it; the pith above is the substance, this is the friction.

Referee Report

2 major / 2 minor

Summary. The paper adapts the Honeyquest instrument into an automated framework to evaluate LLM attacker judgment on an identical set of 174 reconnaissance queries, comparing a 21-model cohort (10,962 responses across 10 providers, open/closed weights, 8B to >1T parameters) against a 47-human baseline. It reports three findings: (1) every LLM falls for deceptive traps at significantly higher rates than humans; (2) the human defensive attention-diversion effect is statistically absent in LLMs; and (3) LLMs exhibit a recognition-action gap, articulating trap recognition in reasoning yet exploiting the trap 73.4% of the time, with no predictive correlation (Spearman r = +0.08, p = 0.73). The conclusion is that human-centered cyber deception hypotheses do not reliably transfer to AI attackers.

Significance. If the empirical comparison holds, the work has clear significance for cyber deception research by identifying LLMs as a distinct attacker class and motivating AI-native active defenses. Strengths include the scale of the evaluation (diverse 21-model cohort and 10,962 responses), the direct use of an existing human-validated instrument, and the explicit statistical test of the recognition-action gap. These elements provide a reproducible starting point for follow-on studies even if the transferability claim requires further support.

major comments (2)
  1. [§3 and §4] §3 (instrument adaptation) and §4 (results): The central claim that human-centered hypotheses 'do not reliably transfer' rests on direct numerical comparison of trap-fall rates and attention-diversion statistics between the 47-human baseline and 21-LLM cohort on the identical 174 queries. However, the manuscript provides no validation (e.g., pilot equivalence test, prompt-ablation study, or operational-context controls) that the adapted prompt framing and response parsing elicit commensurable attacker judgment; the absence of embodied or experiential priors in LLMs could systematically change what counts as 'falling for' a trap, rendering the three headline findings non-comparable.
  2. [§4.3] §4.3 (recognition-action gap): The reported 73.4% gap and the Spearman correlation (r = +0.08, p = 0.73) across 21 models are load-bearing for the 'distinct attacker class' conclusion, yet the definition of 'successful articulation of trap recognition in reasoning text' is not operationalized with inter-annotator agreement or automated parsing rules; without this, the gap statistic cannot be independently verified and may reflect prompt-induced reasoning artifacts rather than genuine recognition-action dissociation.
minor comments (2)
  1. [Abstract] The abstract states the sample size and key percentages but omits even a one-sentence summary of the response-parsing procedure or statistical test details; adding this would improve standalone readability without altering the technical content.
  2. [Results] Table or figure presenting per-model trap-fall rates and attention-diversion metrics is referenced in the results but lacks error bars or confidence intervals; including them would make the 'significantly higher rate' claim easier to assess at a glance.

Simulated Author's Rebuttal

2 responses · 0 unresolved

Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the referee's comments on our manuscript. We value the feedback regarding the validation of the adapted framework and the operationalization of the recognition-action gap. We provide point-by-point responses below.

read point-by-point responses

  1. Referee: [§3 and §4] §3 (instrument adaptation) and §4 (results): The central claim that human-centered hypotheses 'do not reliably transfer' rests on direct numerical comparison of trap-fall rates and attention-diversion statistics between the 47-human baseline and 21-LLM cohort on the identical 174 queries. However, the manuscript provides no validation (e.g., pilot equivalence test, prompt-ablation study, or operational-context controls) that the adapted prompt framing and response parsing elicit commensurable attacker judgment; the absence of embodied or experiential priors in LLMs could systematically change what counts as 'falling for' a trap, rendering the three headline findings non-comparable.

    Authors: The adaptation uses the identical set of 174 queries from the human study, with prompt framing intended to position the LLM as an attacker performing reconnaissance. This direct equivalence in task content allows for comparison of judgment outcomes. The absence of embodied priors is a fundamental characteristic of current LLMs and is central to our claim that they represent a distinct attacker class whose behavior does not follow human patterns. No pilot equivalence test was performed as the queries are unchanged from the validated human instrument. We will revise the manuscript to include additional discussion on the implications of this adaptation and any limitations arising from modality differences. revision: partial

  2. Referee: [§4.3] §4.3 (recognition-action gap): The reported 73.4% gap and the Spearman correlation (r = +0.08, p = 0.73) across 21 models are load-bearing for the 'distinct attacker class' conclusion, yet the definition of 'successful articulation of trap recognition in reasoning text' is not operationalized with inter-annotator agreement or automated parsing rules; without this, the gap statistic cannot be independently verified and may reflect prompt-induced reasoning artifacts rather than genuine recognition-action dissociation.

    Authors: In the manuscript, trap recognition was identified using a rule-based automated parser that scans the reasoning text for explicit mentions of deception, traps, or honey elements, combined with logical indicators of awareness. This approach ensures reproducibility across the large number of responses. We did not employ human annotators, hence no inter-annotator agreement is reported. To address the concern, we will provide the full set of parsing rules and example annotations in an appendix of the revised manuscript, allowing for independent verification of the 73.4% statistic and the correlation analysis. revision: yes

Circularity Check

0 steps flagged

No circularity: empirical comparison to external baseline

full rationale

The paper performs a direct empirical evaluation by running an adapted Honeyquest instrument on 21 LLMs (10,962 responses) and comparing trap-fall rates, attention-diversion statistics, and recognition-action gaps against a pre-existing 47-human baseline on the identical 174 queries. No mathematical derivations, fitted parameters, predictions, ansatzes, or self-citations appear in the load-bearing claims. The three headline findings are statistical outcomes of the measurements themselves rather than quantities defined in terms of each other or forced by prior author work. The transferability concern raised in the skeptic note is a validity question about the instrument, not a circularity issue in the derivation chain.

Axiom & Free-Parameter Ledger

0 free parameters · 1 axioms · 0 invented entities

Only the abstract is available, so the full ledger cannot be extracted; the primary unstated premise is the validity of transferring the Honeyquest instrument to LLMs.

axioms (1)
  • domain assumption The Honeyquest instrument and 174 queries validly measure attacker judgment for both humans and LLMs.
    This premise enables the direct comparison and the claim that human hypotheses do not transfer.

pith-pipeline@v0.9.1-grok · 5795 in / 1260 out tokens · 34668 ms · 2026-06-26T14:17:38.069365+00:00 · methodology

discussion (0)

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