Mobius Injection exploits semantic closure in LLM agents to enable single-message AbO-DDoS attacks achieving up to 51x call amplification and 229x latency inflation.
arXiv:2603.11619 [cs.CR]
7 Pith papers cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
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Pith papers citing it
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2026 7representative citing papers
Crab bridges the agent-OS semantic gap with an eBPF inspector, turn-aligned coordinator, and host engine to deliver 100% recovery correctness while cutting checkpoint traffic up to 87% and adding under 2% overhead.
Analysis of 17k LLM agent skills reveals 520 vulnerable ones with 1,708 leakage issues, primarily from debug output exposure, with a 10-pattern taxonomy and released dataset for future detection.
Routine user chats can unintentionally poison the long-term state of personalized LLM agents, causing authorization drift, tool escalation, and unchecked autonomy, as measured by a new benchmark and reduced by the StateGuard defense.
AgentWard organizes stage-specific security controls with cross-layer coordination to intercept threats across the full lifecycle of autonomous AI agents.
All six evaluated OpenClaw agent frameworks exhibit substantial security vulnerabilities, with reconnaissance behaviors as the most common weakness and agent systems proving significantly riskier than isolated backbone models.
The paper systematizes security for LLM agents in agentic commerce into five threat dimensions, identifies 12 cross-layer attack vectors, and proposes a layered defense architecture.
citing papers explorer
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Can a Single Message Paralyze the AI Infrastructure? The Rise of AbO-DDoS Attacks through Targeted Mobius Injection
Mobius Injection exploits semantic closure in LLM agents to enable single-message AbO-DDoS attacks achieving up to 51x call amplification and 229x latency inflation.
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Crab: A Semantics-Aware Checkpoint/Restore Runtime for Agent Sandboxes
Crab bridges the agent-OS semantic gap with an eBPF inspector, turn-aligned coordinator, and host engine to deliver 100% recovery correctness while cutting checkpoint traffic up to 87% and adding under 2% overhead.
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When Routine Chats Turn Toxic: Unintended Long-Term State Poisoning in Personalized Agents
Routine user chats can unintentionally poison the long-term state of personalized LLM agents, causing authorization drift, tool escalation, and unchecked autonomy, as measured by a new benchmark and reduced by the StateGuard defense.
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A Systematic Security Evaluation of OpenClaw and Its Variants
All six evaluated OpenClaw agent frameworks exhibit substantial security vulnerabilities, with reconnaissance behaviors as the most common weakness and agent systems proving significantly riskier than isolated backbone models.
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SoK: Security of Autonomous LLM Agents in Agentic Commerce
The paper systematizes security for LLM agents in agentic commerce into five threat dimensions, identifies 12 cross-layer attack vectors, and proposes a layered defense architecture.