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Hyperbolic Discounting and Learning over Multiple Horizons

4 Pith papers cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.

4 Pith papers citing it
abstract

Reinforcement learning (RL) typically defines a discount factor as part of the Markov Decision Process. The discount factor values future rewards by an exponential scheme that leads to theoretical convergence guarantees of the Bellman equation. However, evidence from psychology, economics and neuroscience suggests that humans and animals instead have hyperbolic time-preferences. In this work we revisit the fundamentals of discounting in RL and bridge this disconnect by implementing an RL agent that acts via hyperbolic discounting. We demonstrate that a simple approach approximates hyperbolic discount functions while still using familiar temporal-difference learning techniques in RL. Additionally, and independent of hyperbolic discounting, we make a surprising discovery that simultaneously learning value functions over multiple time-horizons is an effective auxiliary task which often improves over a strong value-based RL agent, Rainbow.

fields

cs.LG 3 cs.AI 1

years

2026 3 2019 1

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representative citing papers

Goal-Conditioned Agents that Learn Everything All at Once

cs.LG · 2026-05-22 · unverdicted · novelty 6.0

LEO enables efficient all-goals learning in goal-conditioned RL by jointly predicting for all goals in one network pass, yielding >250x speedup over relabelling and better performance on Craftax.

An AGI with Time-Inconsistent Preferences

cs.AI · 2019-06-23 · unverdicted · novelty 4.0

Standard discounting in AGI design assumes time-consistent preferences, but time-inconsistent preferences prevent an AGI from trusting its future self to follow current plans.

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  • An AGI with Time-Inconsistent Preferences cs.AI · 2019-06-23 · unverdicted · none · ref 2 · internal anchor

    Standard discounting in AGI design assumes time-consistent preferences, but time-inconsistent preferences prevent an AGI from trusting its future self to follow current plans.