EquiMem calibrates shared memory in multi-agent debate by computing a game-theoretic equilibrium from agent queries and paths, outperforming heuristics and LLM validators across benchmarks while remaining robust to adversarial agents.
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arXiv preprint arXiv:2510.02373 , year=
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MEMSAD links anomaly detection gradients to retrieval objectives under encoder regularity to certify detection of continuous memory poisons, achieving perfect TPR/FPR in experiments while exposing a synonym-invariance gap.
Relabeling an identical erroneous claim from the model's own thought role to an external chat role increases explicit correction rates by 23-93 percentage points across 13 model-domain cells, indicating a chat-template artifact rather than a cognitive deficit.
MemAudit combines counterfactual causal influence scores with memory consistency graphs to identify poisoned records in LLM agent memory, reducing MINJA attack success from 70% to 0% in QA and 83.3% to 0% in reasoning tasks.
OEP poisons self-evolving LLM agents by constructing clean edge-case experiences that appear locally valid yet cause harmful over-generalization during reflection, achieving over 50% attack success rate on GPT-4o agents across three domains.
Memory-equipped LLM agents exhibit increasing safety violation rates as memory accumulates across independent tasks, termed temporal memory contamination, detected via a new trigger-probe protocol.
MemLineage enforces untrusted-path persistence in LLM agent memory through Merkle logs, per-principal signatures, and max-of-strong-edges lineage propagation, achieving zero ASR on three poisoning workloads with sub-millisecond overhead.
Agentic memory improves clean reasoning but worsens performance when spurious patterns are present in stored trajectories; CAMEL calibration reduces this reliance while preserving clean performance.
The paper defines and evaluates Trojan Hippo attacks on LLM agent memory, showing 85-100% success in data exfiltration across backends and reduced rates with defenses at varying utility costs.
AgentWard organizes stage-specific security controls with cross-layer coordination to intercept threats across the full lifecycle of autonomous AI agents.
Memory poisoning via lost-provenance documents in agent memory stores creates agent misconduct that safety systems misattribute to model failure; the paper defines Semantic Norm Drift, releases a benchmark, and proposes a new testing method plus a defense.
The paper measures policy-carriage failures during LLM context assembly and evaluates SafeContext as a partial mitigation on Llama, Qwen, and Mistral models.
A synthesis of 247 papers on LLM agent security identifies prompt injection and tool hijacking as dominant threats, notes weakly compositional defenses, and argues for trust boundaries and realistic evaluations.
citing papers explorer
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EquiMem: Calibrating Shared Memory in Multi-Agent Debate via Game-Theoretic Equilibrium
EquiMem calibrates shared memory in multi-agent debate by computing a game-theoretic equilibrium from agent queries and paths, outperforming heuristics and LLM validators across benchmarks while remaining robust to adversarial agents.
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The Trap of Trajectory: Towards Understanding and Mitigating Spurious Correlations in Agentic Memory
Agentic memory improves clean reasoning but worsens performance when spurious patterns are present in stored trajectories; CAMEL calibration reduces this reliance while preserving clean performance.
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Trojan Hippo: Weaponizing Agent Memory for Data Exfiltration
The paper defines and evaluates Trojan Hippo attacks on LLM agent memory, showing 85-100% success in data exfiltration across backends and reduced rates with defenses at varying utility costs.
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Toward Secure LLM Agents: Threat Surfaces, Attacks, Defenses, and Evaluation
A synthesis of 247 papers on LLM agent security identifies prompt injection and tool hijacking as dominant threats, notes weakly compositional defenses, and argues for trust boundaries and realistic evaluations.