Roughly 1% of real resumes contain hidden prompt injections against LLM screeners, prevalence has risen over 1-2 years, and over 90% avoid explicit instructions.
ACE: A Security Architecture for LLM-Integrated App Systems
10 Pith papers cite this work. Polarity classification is still indexing.
10
Pith papers citing it
abstract
LLM-integrated app systems extend the utility of Large Language Models (LLMs) with third-party apps that are invoked by a system LLM using interleaved planning and execution phases to answer user queries. These systems introduce new attack vectors where malicious apps can cause integrity violation of planning or execution, availability breakdown, or privacy compromise during execution. In this work, we identify new attacks impacting the integrity of planning, as well as the integrity and availability of execution in LLM-integrated apps, and demonstrate them against IsolateGPT, a recent solution designed to mitigate attacks from malicious apps. We propose Abstract-Concrete-Execute (ACE), a new secure architecture for LLM-integrated app systems that provides security guarantees for system planning and execution. Specifically, ACE decouples planning into two phases by first creating an abstract execution plan using only trusted information, and then mapping the abstract plan to a concrete plan using installed system apps. We verify that the plans generated by our system satisfy user-specified secure information flow constraints via static analysis on the structured plan output. During execution, ACE enforces data and capability barriers between apps, and ensures that the execution is conducted according to the trusted abstract plan. We show experimentally that ACE is secure against attacks from the InjecAgent and Agent Security Bench benchmarks for indirect prompt injection, and our newly introduced attacks. We also evaluate the utility of ACE in realistic environments, using the Tool Usage suite from the LangChain benchmark. Our architecture represents a significant advancement towards hardening LLM-based systems using system security principles.
citation-role summary
background 3
citation-polarity summary
fields
cs.CR 10years
2026 10roles
background 3polarities
background 3representative citing papers
AuthGraph aligns an execution provenance graph with a clean authorization graph to detect parameter-source deviations from user intent, reducing attack success rates to 1-2% on AgentDojo and AgentDyn while retaining most task utility.
ClawGuard detects LLM agent workflow hijacking by capturing and classifying electromagnetic emanations from hardware with 0.9945 AUC, 100% true-positive rate, and 1.16% false-positive rate on a 7.82 TB RF dataset.
ARGUS defends LLM agents from context-aware prompt injections by tracking information provenance and verifying decisions against trustworthy evidence, reducing attack success to 3.8% while retaining 87.5% task utility.
GAAP guarantees confidentiality of private user data for AI agents by enforcing user-specified permissions deterministically through persistent information flow tracking, without trusting the agent or requiring attack-free models.
Parallax enforces structural separation between AI thinking and acting via independent multi-tier validation, information flow control, and state rollback, blocking 98.9% of 280 adversarial attacks with zero false positives even when the reasoning system is fully compromised.
No existing AI security framework covers a majority of the 193 identified multi-agent system threats in any category, with OWASP Agentic Security Initiative achieving the highest overall coverage at 65.3%.
ClawLess introduces a formal fine-grained security model for AI agents with runtime-adaptive policies enforced via user-space kernel and BPF syscall interception.
AgentGuard is an ABAC framework for tool-use LLM agents with lightweight client integration and three server-side inspection mechanisms for single-tool and cross-tool risks.
citing papers explorer
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Security Considerations for Multi-agent Systems
No existing AI security framework covers a majority of the 193 identified multi-agent system threats in any category, with OWASP Agentic Security Initiative achieving the highest overall coverage at 65.3%.
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