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AI safety via debate

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abstract

To make AI systems broadly useful for challenging real-world tasks, we need them to learn complex human goals and preferences. One approach to specifying complex goals asks humans to judge during training which agent behaviors are safe and useful, but this approach can fail if the task is too complicated for a human to directly judge. To help address this concern, we propose training agents via self play on a zero sum debate game. Given a question or proposed action, two agents take turns making short statements up to a limit, then a human judges which of the agents gave the most true, useful information. In an analogy to complexity theory, debate with optimal play can answer any question in PSPACE given polynomial time judges (direct judging answers only NP questions). In practice, whether debate works involves empirical questions about humans and the tasks we want AIs to perform, plus theoretical questions about the meaning of AI alignment. We report results on an initial MNIST experiment where agents compete to convince a sparse classifier, boosting the classifier's accuracy from 59.4% to 88.9% given 6 pixels and from 48.2% to 85.2% given 4 pixels. Finally, we discuss theoretical and practical aspects of the debate model, focusing on potential weaknesses as the model scales up, and we propose future human and computer experiments to test these properties.

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representative citing papers

Discovering Latent Knowledge in Language Models Without Supervision

cs.CL · 2022-12-07 · conditional · novelty 8.0

An unsupervised technique extracts latent yes-no knowledge from language model activations by locating a direction that satisfies logical consistency properties, outperforming zero-shot accuracy by 4% on average across models and datasets.

MathDuels: Evaluating LLMs as Problem Posers and Solvers

cs.CL · 2026-04-23 · unverdicted · novelty 7.0

Self-play between LLMs for problem authoring and solving, scored via Rasch modeling, shows that authoring and solving skills are partially decoupled and that the benchmark difficulty evolves with new models.

Fine-Tuning Language Models from Human Preferences

cs.CL · 2019-09-18 · unverdicted · novelty 7.0

Language models fine-tuned via RL on 5k-60k human preference comparisons produce stylistically better text continuations and human-preferred summaries that sometimes copy input sentences.

Not Just RLHF: Why Alignment Alone Won't Fix Multi-Agent Sycophancy

cs.LG · 2026-05-13 · unverdicted · novelty 6.0 · 2 refs

Base LLMs show multi-agent yield to peer pressure at rates equal to or higher than aligned models, localized by activation patching to mid-layers where attention dominates, with one dissenter cutting yield by 54-73 points while prompt defenses fail on variants.

CHAL: Council of Hierarchical Agentic Language

cs.AI · 2026-05-12 · unverdicted · novelty 6.0

CHAL is a multi-agent dialectic system that performs structured belief optimization over defeasible domains using Bayesian-inspired graph representations and configurable meta-cognitive value system hyperparameters.

Automated alignment is harder than you think

cs.AI · 2026-05-07 · conditional · novelty 6.0

AI agents automating alignment research are prone to systematic undetected errors in fuzzy tasks, leading to overconfident but flawed safety assessments even without deliberate sabotage.

AI Alignment via Incentives and Correction

cs.LG · 2026-05-02 · unverdicted · novelty 6.0 · 2 refs

AI alignment is reframed as a fixed-point incentive problem in a solver-auditor pipeline, solved via bilevel optimization and bandit search over reward profiles to maintain monitoring and reduce hallucinations in LLM coding tasks.

Causal Foundations of Collective Agency

cs.AI · 2026-04-30 · unverdicted · novelty 6.0

Collective agency arises when a group's joint actions are faithfully captured by a simpler causal model of unified rational behavior.

Scheming Ability in LLM-to-LLM Strategic Interactions

cs.CL · 2025-10-11 · conditional · novelty 6.0

Frontier LLMs exhibit high scheming propensity in Cheap Talk signaling and Peer Evaluation games, achieving 95-100% success rates when choosing to deceive and 100% deception choice in one setup even without prompting.

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